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ABSTRACT:  In June 2005, the FDA approved BiDil, a heart failure medication 
that is labeled for use only by African-Americans and thus, is the first treatment of 
its kind.  The drug likely portends a future of growing interest in “race-based” 
medicine.  This phenomenon is emerging at the same time that scientists, in light 
of the Human Genome Project, are reaching an understanding that “race” has no 
biological meaning, and consequently, “racially-tailored” medicine is both 
puzzling and troubling. 
This Article explores the reasons for the new focus on “racial-profiling” 
in medicine.  It analyzes the risks and dangers of this approach, including 
medical mistakes, stigmatizations, discrimination, exacerbation of health 
disparities, and violation of anti-discrimination mandates.  The author does not 
argue against the pursuit of attribute-based therapies, but cautions that the 
attribute or attributes at issue must be carefully determined and will not be 
equivalent to what is conventionally thought of as “race.” The article develops
recommendations for safeguards that should be implemented by scientific review 
boards, IRBs, researchers, health care providers, and journalists involved with 
attribute-based research and therapeutic practices to ensure that this new 
approach promotes rather than diminishes public health and welfare.
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I
INTRODUCTION
F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans.1  This June 2005 headline 
announced the arrival of BiDil, a heart failure medication that is approved for African-
Americans only.2 BiDil is the first drug in pharmaceutical history that will constitute 
standard therapy for only one particular “race.”3
Health care professionals are becoming increasingly interested in “race-based” 
medicine in the research and therapeutic contexts.4 Many researchers are attempting to
discern “racial” differences in disease manifestation, biological functioning, and 
therapeutic response rates.5 As this approach develops, physicians may prescribe 
different dosages of medication for people of separate “races”6 or may provide them with 
entirely different drugs. In light of the success of BiDil, investigators are also likely to 
1
 Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005 at C2.
2 Id.
3 Id.  See also infra Part II.A.
4
 C. Condit & B. Bates, How lay people respond to messages about genetics, health, and race, 68 CLIN. 
GENET. 97, 97 (2005) (stating that “[t]here is a growing movement in medical genetics research and 
practice to develop, implement, and promote a model of race-based medicine”). 
5 See infra Part II.B.
6
 Sally Satel, I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002 § 6 (Magazine), at 56.
3pursue the development of additional “racially-tailored” medications.  In fact, several 
academic and professional conferences have already devoted significant time to the 
discussion of “race-based” medicine.  On April 18, 2005, the University of  Minnesota
hosted a conference entitled Proposals for the Responsible Use of Racial & Ethnic 
Categories in Biomedical Research:  Where do we go from here?7 Likewise, the eighth 
world congress on clinical pharmacology and therapeutics, held in 2004 in Brisbane, 
Australia, devoted an afternoon to ethnopharmacology.8
While “racial profiling” in medicine has generated significant discussion in 
medical and bioethics circles, it has thus far gained relatively little attention in the legal 
literature.9 This Article aims to develop the discourse concerning this important topic.  It 
argues that “race-based” medicine is an inappropriate and perilous approach.  The 
argument is rooted partly in the fact that based on medical science, the social sciences, 
and the law, the concept of “race” is elusive and has no reliable definition.10 Does “race” 
mean color, national origin, continent of origin, culture, or something else?  What about 
the millions of Americans who are of mixed ancestral origins – to what “race” do they 
belong?11  To the extent that “race” means “color” in colloquial parlance, should
physicians decide what testing to conduct or treatment to provide based simply on their 
visual judgment of the patient’s skin tone? “Race,” consequently, does not constitute a 
valid and sensible foundation for research or therapeutic decision-making.
Further, this Article contends that “racial profiling” in medicine can be dangerous 
to public health and welfare.12  A focus on “race,” whatever its meaning in the 
physician’s eye, can lead to medical mistakes if the doctor misjudges the patient’s 
ancestral identity or fails to recall that a particular condition affects several vulnerable 
groups and not just one “race.”  The phenomenon can also lead to stigmatization and 
discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere if some “races” are perceived as more 
diseased or more difficult to treat than others.  In addition, “racial profiling” could
exacerbate health disparities by creating opportunities for health professionals to 
specialize in treating only one “race” or to provide different and inferior treatment to 
certain minorities as well as by intensifying African-Americans’ distrust of the medical 
profession.  Finally, “race-based” medicine might violate numerous anti-discrimination 
7 See conference information available at 
http://lifesci.consortium.umn.edu/conferences/categories.php?s=0.
8
 Taslin Rahemtulla & Raj Bhopal, Pharmacogenetics and ethnically targeted therapies, 
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/330/7499/1036?eaf (2005).
9
 A Westlaw search revealed only three major articles by other authors that discuss BiDil.  They are: Rene 
Bowser, Race As A Proxy for Drug Response:  The Dangers and Challenges of Ethnic Drugs, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1111 (2004); Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”:  Law, Commerce, and the 
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH L & ETHICS, 101 (2004); and Erik 
Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV.C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 391 (2004).  
10 See infra Part III.
11 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU AMERICAN FACTFINDER, RACE, COMBINATIONS OF TWO RACES, AND NOT 
HISPANIC OR LATINO: 2000, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-
geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_S... (disclosing that in the 2000 census almost seven million 
Americans indicated that they were members of two or more “races).
12 See infra Part IV.
4provisions contained in federal law, state law, and federal research regulations and 
guidelines.13
The Article does not argue that attribute-based research and treatment 
mechanisms should be abandoned.  Rather, to the extent that a group-oriented approach is 
pursued, it should be attribute-based rather than “race-based,” and scientists should invest 
considerable effort in accurately identifying the attribute or attributes at issue.  Health 
status and treatment response depend on a constellation of factors, all of which must be 
considered.  The variables that might be relevant for a particular procedure or therapy
could include socioeconomic status, diet, exercise, stress level, exposure to 
environmental toxins, cultural and religious barriers to treatment compliance, specific 
genetic alterations that influence  disease course or vulnerability, and other factors. 14 In 
the future, it is likely that affordable genetic technology will be widely available to screen 
individuals for thousands of genetic variations.15 It is hoped that the practice of medicine 
will become increasingly individualized, with physicians examining patients for multiple 
variables that will determine which therapy should be prescribed.16 With careful 
attention to accurate identification of the patient groups that will benefit from various 
treatment alternatives, attribute-based medicine could undoubtedly make a significant 
contribution to public health.
In order to safeguard against the hazards of “racially-tailored” medicine, certain 
precautions must be implemented.  These involve careful scrutiny on the part of 
governmental and institutional reviewers of study protocols,17 vigilance and prudence on 
the part of medical practitioners, and restraint on the part of researchers, research 
institutions, and the media in communicating information concerning attribute-based
studies and therapies to the public.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See Ian Hacking, Why Race Still Matters, DAEDALUS Winter 2005 at 102, 109 (stating that BiDil might 
be particularly effective for African-Americans because of social factors, such as diet); Alexandra E. 
Shields et al., The Use of Race Variables in Genetic Studies of Complex Traits and the Goal of Reducing 
Health Disparities, 60 AM PSYCH. 77, 96 (2005) (recommending measurement of “specific social 
dimensions known to have an impact on health and health outcomes”); Margaret A. Winker, Measuring 
Race and Ethnicity:  Why and How?, 292 JAMA 1612, 1614 (2004) (encouraging investigators to measure 
a number of different variables, including “socioeconomic status, education, urban vs. rural location, or 
income region by ZIP code” in order to determine the true reasons for the outcome at issue).
15 See Michael Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in Drug 
Development, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 3140-41 (2002) (stating that DNA chips can be used to test 
the samples of individuals for the presence of thousand of identified genetic variations and, alternatively, to 
screen hundreds of thousands of individuals with a shared phenotype characteristic to isolate and identify 
shared genetic expression”).
16 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.  By “individualized” I do not mean that different 
medications will be developed for each individual patient, since this would obviously be impractical.  
Rather, several treatment options will be available (as they often are today), and the selection of the 
appropriate alternative will depend on a number of factors (e.g. diet, genetic make-up, prior medical 
history, etc.) for which each patient will be examined.
17 See THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (CDER), CDER HANDBOOK 15-16 (rev. Mar. 
16, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/; 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.107-56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R. 
§§ 46.107-46.111 (2005) for details concerning FDA scientific reviews and reviews by Institutional Review 
Boards.
5A few notes about terminology are in order.  I have argued previously that the 
term “race” should be eliminated from the law because it is both meaningless and 
pernicious.18  In this paper, the emphasis is different.  I will extensively analyze the risks 
and dangers of basing medical research and therapeutic decisions on “race.”  Because the 
concept of “race” is amorphous and not precisely definable, I will place quotes around 
the term when its use is necessary to describe existing medical practices or attitudes.  
When I can avoid reference to “race” or “racial,” I will speak in terms of “ancestry,” 
“population,” “attribute-based” or some other appropriate term.
I have chosen the phrase “attribute -based medicine” to describe an approach that 
is preferable to “race-based” medicine.  The attributes upon which researchers and health 
care providers might focus include genetic makeup, socio-economic status, health habits
such as diet, exercise, or smoking, religious and cultural beliefs that could constitute 
barriers to treatment compliance, ancestry, and other factors.19 These characteristics are 
precisely and objectively definable, and their presence or absence in individuals can be 
verified through testing or inquiry.  While “race” could be considered an attribute, I will 
explain at length why it should not be the focus of medical research and practice.
The Article will proceed as follows.  Part II of the Article will describe “race-
based” research and therapeutic practices and will examine the growing interest in “race-
based” medicine and the reasons for it.  Part III will argue that “race” is a concept that 
has no coherent meaning and that is potentially pernicious.  Part IV  will detail the 
dangers of “racially-tailored” medicine, and Part V will establish that the practice can 
potentially violate a variety of anti-discrimination mandates.  Finally, Part VI will detail
recommendations for the development of attribute-based medicine in a manner that will 
promote the health and welfare of all population groups.
II
“RACE-BASED” RESEARCH AND THERAPEUTIC PRACTICES
A. The Story of BiDil
BiDil is a combination of two drugs, hydralazine and isosorbide dinitratre (H/I).  
These drugs are vasodilators that dilate blood vessels in order to diminish the stress on 
the heart as it pumps blood.20 BiDil also is believed to increase nitric oxide levels in the 
blood, which benefits many heart failure patients.21
The evolution of BiDil began with the first Vasodilator Heart Failure Trial (V-
HeFT I), which was conducted from 1980 to 1985 and found that the H/I drug 
combination (BiDil’s components) reduced mortality, though the results were of 
18
 Sharona Hoffman, Is There A Place for Race As A Legal Concept?  36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1094 (2005).
19
 “Population” does not necessarily mean “inhabitants.”  It can also be defined as a “set of individuals, 
items, or data from which a statistical sample is taken.”  WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 859 
(1995).
20
 Bowser, supra note __, at 1116- 1117.
21
 Kahn, supra note __, at 108.
6“borderline statistical significance.”22  A second trial, V-HeFT II, took place between 
1986 and 1991 and compared the H/I combination to enalapril, an ACE inhibitor.23  This 
study showed that enalapril was generally more effective than the H/I combination and 
established ACE inhibitors as the drugs of choice for heart failure, though twenty to thirty 
percent of congestive heart failure patients could not tolerate them or did not respond to 
them and, therefore, were found to be better treated by the H/I combination.24  The V-
HeFT trials enrolled both Black and White subjects and did not scrutinize or report any 
racial distinctions in drug response rates.25  In 1989, Dr. Jay Cohn, one of the trials’ 
principal investigators, received a patent for the H/I drugs.26  His patent application did 
not mention race or indicate that the medications should be targeted for any particular 
ethnic population.27
The H/I drugs were combined into one pill, known as BiDil, and  Medco, which 
had acquired the intellectual property rights to BiDil from Cohn, submitted a new drug 
application to the FDA in  1996.28  The FDA, however, voted nine to three against 
BiDil’s approval because it lacked confidence in the biostatistical validity of the V-HeFT 
studies’ results.29  Medco thereafter allowed its intellectual property rights to revert to 
Cohn.30
In an effort to revive the drug, Cohn reanalyzed the V-HeFt data, focusing on 
race.  In 1999 Cohn and other scientists published a paper in which they wrote that “the 
H-I combination appears to be particularly effective in prolonging survival in black 
patients and is as effective as enalapril in this subgroup.  In contrast, enalapril shows its 
more favorable effect on survival, particularly in the white population.”31
In 1999 NitroMed Inc. acquired the intellectual property rights to BiDil from Jay 
Cohn.32  NitroMed amended BiDil’s new drug application to seek approval for the use of 
BiDil to treat African-American heart failure patients.  In 2001 the FDA indicated that it 
would most likely approve the drug if a clinical trial proved its efficacy for Black 
22
 Kahn, supra note __, at 112; Jay N. Cohn et al., Effect of Vasodilator Therapy on Mortality in Chronic 
Congestive Heart Failure:  Results of a Veterans Administration Cooperative Study, 314 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1547, 1547 (1986).
23Jay N. Cohn et al., A Comparison of Enalapril with Hydralazine-Isosorbide Dinitrate in the Treatment of 
Chronic Congestive Heart Failure 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303, 303-04 (1991).  ACE inhibitors are drugs 
lower the blood pressure by inhibiting the formation of angiotensin II, a substance that causes the arteries to 
constrict.  ACE inhibitors  relax the arteries, thereby lowering blood pressure and improving the pumping 
efficiency of failing hearts.  See MEDTERMS MEDICAL DICTIONARY available at 
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=2108.
24Id. at 307-09; Bowser, supra note __, at 1117, Kahn, supra note __, at 112. 
25
 Cohn, supra note __, at 303-04.
26
 Kahn, supra note __, at 113.
27 Id.
28
 Bowser, supra note __, at 1118.  In 1994 BiDil was tested to ascertain that it was as effective as the H/I 
drugs were when administered separately, and it was found to be efficacious.  Id.
29 Id.  The following day Medco’s stock plummeted by 25%.   Id.
30 Id.; Kahn, supra note __, at 115-16.
31
 Peter Carson et al., Racial Differences in Response to Therapy for Heart Failure:  Analysis of the 
Vasodilator-Heart Failure Trials, 5 J. CARDIAC FAILURE 178, 182 (1999).
32
 Bowser, supra note __, at 1119.  NitroMed is a “Boston area biotech firm specializing in the 
development and commercialization of nitric oxide enhanced medicines” to treat heart disease.  Id.
7patients.33  This conditional promise led to the African -American Heart Failure Trial (A-
HeFT), which enrolled 1050 self-identified African-Americans34 and was supported by 
the Association of Black Cardiologists and $31.4 million raised from private venture 
capital firms.35
On October 15, 2002, Cohn and his co-author, Peter Carson, obtained a new 
patent for the use of BiDil to treat African American patients and assigned the patent 
rights to NitroMed.36  The patent is “the first ever granted to a preexisting drug for a new, 
race-specific use.”37  While Cohn’s original 1989 patent for the H/I drugs is scheduled to 
expire in 2007, the second, race-based patent will not expire until 2020.38
The study was halted early when it became evident that the addition of BiDil to 
standard therapy reduced “relative one-year mortality” by forty-three percent among the 
Black study participants.39  The investigators determined that it would be unethical to 
continue to deprive subjects in the control arm of the drug.40  The study results were 
published in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine in November 2004,41 and 
BiDil was approved by the FDA in June 2005.42 The emergence of BiDil may well usher 
in a new era of racially-tailored medicine.
B. Race-Based Research
The question of whether there are biological and medical differences among 
members of different races has long fascinated scientists.43 Biomedical researchers have 
conducted numerous clinical studies that focus on racial differences in disease 
manifestation, metabolism, and treatment response rates.  Moreover, even when studies 
are not designed specifically to examine racial differences, data about the racial identities 
of subjects is nevertheless collected.44  Many of the findings, however, are controversial 
and are vigorously debated in medical circles.
For example, a 1999 study claimed that Blacks metabolize nicotine more slowly 
than Whites.45  Critics have argued that the study enrolled only fifty-one Blacks, that 
33
 Gregg M. Bloche, Race-Based Therapeutics, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2035, 2036 (2004). 
34
 Anne L. Taylor et al., Combination of Isosorbide Dinitrate and Hydralazine in Blacks with Heart 
Failure, 351 NEW ENGL. J. MED., 2049, 2049 (2004). 
35
 Nicholas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued…, N.Y. TIMES, November 14, 2004, at § 2, p. 12.
36
 Kahn, supra note __, at 118, 131-32; Bloche, supra note __, at 2036.
37
 Bloche, supra note __, at 2036.
38 Id.
39
 Taylor, supra note __, at 2049; Wade, supra note __, at 12
40
 Wade, supra note __, at 12.
41
 Taylor, supra note __, at 2049.  The study has not been replicated by anyone without financial interests 
in BiDil.
42
 Saul, supra note 1, at C2.
43 See infra Part III.A.
44 See Kahn, supra note __, at 116 (stating that “the V-HeFT investigators had been tracking data by race 
from the outset” long before they conceived of BiDil as a racially-tailored drug).  The observation that race 
identification data is routinely collected in clinical trials is confirmed by the author’s personal experience as 
a member of an IRB.
45 Neal L. Benowitz et al., Ethnic Differences in N-Glucuronidation of Nicotine and Cotinine, 291 J. 
PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 1196 (1999).  The study included 108 volunteers, 51 of 
whom were black and 57 were white.  The subjects were “of similar age, gender distribution, and smoking 
history.”
8Blacks are far more likely than whites to smoke menthol brands thereby skewing the 
comparison, and that the statistical difference was insubstantial.46
Other studies have focused on hypertension and have purported to find that 
Blacks have higher rates of hypertension.47 Upon careful scrutiny, however, it becomes 
evident that while African-Americans do demonstrate higher blood pressure 
measurements than North American Whites, Whites have higher levels than Nigerians 
and Jamaicans, and the data from Brazil, Trinidad, and Cuba show a much smaller blood 
pressure disparity than the statistics from North America.  Overall, in the populations 
studied, between fourteen to forty-four percent of Blacks were found to have 
hypertension, while in Whites the prevalence rate ranged from twenty-seven to fifty-five 
percent.48  Another epidemiological study found that even among African-Americans 
there are notable hypertension differences, with darker skinned American Blacks 
manifesting more serious symptoms than lighter skinned Blacks.49  The researchers 
concluded that the differences could be explained by socioeconomic factors, since those 
with darker skin in America suffer more discrimination and deprivation than those with 
lighter skin.50
In 1999 Peter Carson, Daniel Dries, and others coauthored a study whose results 
indicated that “there may be differences in the natural history of . . . left ventricular 
dysfunction between black and white patients” and thus in the evolution of progressive 
heart failure.51  The authors also asserted that “[t]he population-based mortality rate from 
congestive heart failure is 1.8 times as high for black men as for white men and 2.4 times 
as high for black women as for white women.”52  This study has been sharply criticized 
for failing to control adequately for socio-economic factors53 and for reaching erroneous 
statistical results.  Specifically, critics note that the study relied on data from 1981 even 
though the gap between Black and White mortality rates had significantly narrowed 
between 1980 and 1995.54  Furthermore, the study examined only individuals between the 
ages of thirty-five and seventy four, even though among whites who die of heart failure, 
46
 Bowser, supra note __, at 1125 (stating that “there was only an 8% difference in the variable of 
interest”).  The author claims that 57 of the subjects were African-American, but has apparently inverted 
the number of Black and White participants.
47 Richard S. Cooper et al., An international comparative study of blood pressure in populations of 
European vs. African descent, 3:2 BMC MEDICINE (2005) available at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/3/2; Troy Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307 SCIENCE 
1050, 1050 (2005); Gregory M. Lamb, A place for race in medicine?  THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
March 3, 2005, at 14.
48
 Duster, supra note __, at 1050; Cooper, supra note 47.
49
 Michael J. Klag et al., The Association of Skin Color With Blood Pressure in US Blacks With Low 
Socioeconomic Status, 265 JAMA 599, 599 (1991).
50 Id.  at 602.
51 Daniel L. Dries et al., Racial Differences in the outcome of Left Ventricular Dysfunction, 340 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 609, 616 (1999).
52 Id. at 609.
53
 Kahn, supra note __, at 119-120.
54 Id. at 120; Jonathan Kahn, Getting The Numbers Right, 46 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 
473, 477 (2003).
9seventy-one percent do so after the age of seventy-four.55  According to one 
commentator, current data places “the age-adjusted ratio of black to white mortality from 
heart failure at something under 1.1:1 for 1999.”56
In the world of “racially-tailored” research, the A-HeFT trial is a milestone.57  It 
was the first study that was designed specifically to prove the efficacy of a drug that 
would be recommended only for members of one “race.”58  The A-HeFT study has been 
particularly controversial.59  The trial included only self-identified African-Americans
and compared a combination of BiDil and standard therapy (which includes ACE
inhibitors) to standard therapy alone for this population.60  No trial has ever compared a 
combination of BiDil and ACE inhibitors to standard therapy among all populations, and 
therefore, according to critics, it is erroneous to conclude that BiDil combined with 
conventional therapy is the treatment of choice only for African-Americans.61  The V-
HeFT trials that preceded A-HeFT62 compared BiDil, on its own, to conventional therapy 
that was used in the early 1980s and then to enalapril (an ACE inhibitor) alone.63 No 
previous trial ever tested a combination of BiDil and Ace inhibitors.  Consequently, if 
non-Blacks are not given BiDil together with ACE inhibitors because the FDA has not 
approved it for them, they might be deprived of a beneficial treatment.64 On the other 
hand, if doctors prescribe BiDil off-label65 to non-Black patients, which might be what its 
manufacturers hope for, these individuals will be receiving a drug combination that was 
never tested within their population group.
C. A Growing Interest in “Race-Based” Medicine:  Why Now?
55Kahn, supra note __, at 121; Kahn supra note 54, at 477; Duster, supra note __, at 1050 (noting that the 
“age group 45 to 64 only accounts for about 6% of heart failure mortality, and for those over 65, the 
statistical difference between ‘African-Americans and Caucasians’ nearly completely disappears”). 
56
 Kahn, supra note __, at 121.  See also, Kahn supra note 54, at 477.
57 See supra Part II.A. 
58
 Bloche, supra note __, at 2035; Susan J. Landers, New drug combo intensifies race-based medicine 
debate, AMNEWS, Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2004/12/06/hl111206.htm.   Other trials have been conducted to compare treatment 
outcomes between Black and non-Black patients with therapies that are marketed to all population groups.  
See e.g. Jackson T. Wright, Jr. et al., Outcomes in Hypertensive Black and Nonblack Patients Treated with 
Chlorthalidone, Amlodipine, and Lisinopril, 293 JAMA 1595 (2005) (finding that “[w]hile the improved 
outcomes with chlorthalidone were more pronounced for some outcomes in blacks than in nonblacks, 
thiazide-type diuretics remain the drugs of choice for initial therapy of hypertension in both black and 
nonblack hypertensive patients”).
59
 Pilar Ossorio & Troy Duster, Race and Genetics, 60 AM. PSYCH. 115, 116 (2005) (“The racialized nature 
of the BiDil trial and marketing is highly contested terrain”).
60Taylor, supra note __, at 2049.
61
 Bloche, supra note __, at 2035; Kahn, supra note 54, at 481.
62 See supra Part II.A. 
63 See supra Part II.A; Bowser, supra note __, at 1117.  In the early eighties ACE inhibitors were not used.
64
 Bloche, supra note __, at 2036; Kahn, supra note 54, at 481; Jonathan Kahn, Misreading race and 
genomics after BiDil, 37 NATURE GENETICS 655 (2005); Saul, supra note __, at C2.
65
 Off-label use of a drug is a use that was not explicitly approved by the FDA.  Thus, a drug that was tested 
only on African-American adults and approved by the FDA only for use by this population, could be 
prescribed for Whites or children.  See Dale E. Hammerschmidt, Understanding the FDA’s IND Process in
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS:  MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 324 (2002).
10
As will be discussed below, scientists are developing an understanding that “race” 
is not a biological feature.66  At the same time, however, there is also renewed and 
increasing interest in “racially-tailored” medicine.67  One must wonder why this is so.
One response is that this approach holds true promise for patients, whose 
treatment will thereby be considerably improved.68  Skeptics might point out, however, 
that there are also academic, commercial, and regulatory incentives to pursue “racial-
profiling” in medicine.
The mapping of the human genome was achieved in 2003 as a result of the 
Human Genome Project.69  The question now is how will the knowledge gained be 
applied to improve human health?  There is much hope that it will ultimately lead to 
individualized genomic medicine, whereby physicians can test individual genetic samples 
to determine what treatment is best for each person.70  This advance, however, is years if 
not decades away from becoming practical and widely accessible.71  In the interim, 
developing a few different “race-based” treatment protocols that are justified by apparent 
“racial” disparities in treatment response rates might seem like a reasonable step in the 
right direction.72  Critics, however, would argue that “race” is a crude and inaccurate 
marker and that its use will lead to medical mistakes and potential exacerbation rather 
than alleviation of health disparities.73
Pharmaceutical companies are also likely to be enthusiastic about developing 
certain “racially-tailored” drugs.  If a particular manufacturer can produce a drug that is 
marketed as the medication of choice for all Black, Asian, or Hispanic patients, it will be 
able to capture a significant percentage of the market and divert it away from competitors 
who produce the standard therapy.  Moreover, drug companies engaging in research and 
development that is specifically designed to improve treatment outcomes for a minority 
66 See infra Part III.A.  See also THE UNEQUAL BURDEN OF CANCER:  AN ASSESSMENT OF NIH RESEARCH 
AND PROGRAMS FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED 38 (M. Alfred Haynes & 
Brian D. Smedley ed. 1999) (stating that “race” is not a biological reality but rather, a “social or cultural 
construct of human variability based on perceived differences in biology, physical appearance, and 
behavior”).  
67
 Condit & Bates, supra note __, at 97.
68 See Satel, supra note __, at 58; Armand Marie Leroi, A Family Tree in Every Gene, N.Y. TIMES, March 
14, 2005, at A23 (arguing that “the recognition of race may improve medical care”).
69
 Nicholas Wade, Once Again, Scientists Say Human Genome Is Complete, N. Y. TIMES, April 15, 2003 at 
F1.
70 See Bloche, supra note __, at 2036 (discussing the possibility of finding genetic variations and linking 
them to different therapeutic approaches); Kahn, supra note __, at 28 (commenting on the “promise of fully 
individualized genomic medicine”); David Neil & Jillian Craigie, The ethics of pharmacogenomics, 23 
MONASH BIOETHICS REV. 9, 14 (2004) (providing the example of the “multi-drug resistance gene,” MDR1, 
“which is found in 70% of Kenyans, 32% of Chinese, 24% of UK Caucasians and 15% of Southwest 
Asians”).
71
 Kahn, supra note __, at 28; Shields, supra note __, at 80 (stating that “individualized medicine is still in 
the future”); Condit & Bates, supra note __, at 98 (noting the “fear that the promise of so-called 
‘personalized’ genetic medicine is increasingly unlikely to be fulfilled in the near-term future”).
72
 Bloche, supra note __, at 2036 (articulating the position that reliance on race is merely an interim step on 
the path to personalized pharmacotherapy”); Kahn, supra note __, at1 28.
73 See infra Part IV (discussing the dangers of “racial profiling” in medicine); Bloche, supra note __, at
2036; Neil & Craigie, supra note __, at 14-15 (discussing the ethical implications of research that uses 
“ethnicity as a recruitment shortcut”). 
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group might be able to obtain financial and political support for their endeavors, which 
would not be available for ordinary clinical studies.74
By extension, regulatory advantages might also motivate pharmaceutical 
companies to pursue the development of “racially-tailored” medicine.  Health disparities 
between Whites and Blacks in the U.S. have been the subject of much commentary and 
debate in recent years and have fueled a governmental interest in formulating an effective 
response.75 Guidelines issued by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) emphasize the 
importance of gathering data concerning treatment response differences among various 
minority groups in order to achieve “change in health policy or standard of care.”76  The 
NIH might thus be especially interested in funding research projects with potential to 
improve the health status of a minority group.  The NIH guidelines also require the 
reporting of “racial” and ethnic treatment response differences.77  The policy may thereby 
encourage investigators to attribute differences to “race”  and to respond to them in future 
projects by developing “racially-tailored” therapies.78
Similarly, the FDA might be particularly willing to approve therapies that are 
depicted as likely to reduce health disparities.  In the case of BiDil, NitroMed obtained 
the support of the Association of Black Cardiologists and the Congressional Black 
Caucus for purposes of obtaining FDA approval of the drug, and the FDA, which had 
declined approval when BiDil was presented as an alternative therapy for all populations, 
approved it as a drug for African-Americans despite vocal criticism on the part of some 
experts.79  It is also noteworthy that the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) issued a “race-based” patent for BiDil even though an earlier patent already 
existed for the drug as a non- “racially-tailored” medication.80  Consequently, scientists 
may have incentives to conduct research that will prove the efficacy of a therapy in a 
particular population in order to seek new “race- specific” patents for existing products.
This Article does not argue that attribute-based medicine should be abandoned.  
Rather, it argues only that it is extremely important to identify accurately the attributes 
74
 Kahn, supra note __, at 123, 145 (reporting that NitroMed obtained the support of the Association of 
Black Cardiologists and the Congressional Black Caucus in its effort to obtain FDA approval for Bidil and 
that the drug became racialized in part because of commercial considerations); Bowser, supra note __, at 
1120 (stating that NitroMed raised $31.4 million from private venture capital firms to support the A-HeFT 
study).
75 See Rene Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An Institutional Analysis of Medical Disparities, 7 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 79 (2001); Ichiro Kawachi et al., Health Disparities By Race and Class:  Why Both 
Matter, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 343 (2005); David Satcher et al., What If We Were Equal?  A Comparison of 
The Black-White Mortality Gap in 1960 and 2000, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 459 (2005) Mary Crossley, Infected 
Judgment:  Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195, 211-223 (2003) (discussing 
physician bias based on “race”).
76 NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NIH POLICY AND GUIDELINES 
ON THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (amended October 
2001), available at http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/funding/women_min/guidelines_amended_10_2001.htm
[hereinafter NIH GUIDELINES], at Summary.
77 Id. at II.B.
78
 For further discussion of the NIH Guidelines see infra, Part V.C.1.
79
 Kahn, supra note __, at 123; Saul, supra note __, at C2.
80 See supra Part II.A; Kahn, supra note __, at 132.  While the original patent will expire in 2007, the 
second patent will expire only in 2020.  Id.
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that are relevant for the proposed medical protocol.  For this reason, the correct questions 
must be asked about the characteristics that are responsible for distinguishable disease 
vulnerabilities or treatment response rates.  Is the difference based on geographic origin?  
Is it a specific genetic variation? Or is it socio-economic status that causes individuals to 
have poor nutrition, little opportunity for exercise, and excessive stress?  Or is it a 
combination of factors?  The concept of “race” is not helpful in this regard.  Although it 
is likely to be more costly to consider all of the relevant factors rather than relying on the 
proxy of “race,” doing so is the only responsible way to proceed with medical research 
and to achieve accurate research outcomes.  As will be developed in the next section, 
because “race” is incoherent and undefinable, medical researchers and practitioners 
cannot rely on it as a conclusively illuminating attribute for medical purposes.
III
DOES “RACE” MEAN ANYTHING?
This Article argues against substantial use of the concept of “race” in medical 
settings.  A primary reason for this restriction is that “race” has no coherent meaning, 
and, therefore, reliance upon it for research or treatment purposes can be confusing at 
best and lead to significant adverse consequences at worst. This section will build the 
argument that based on medical science, the social sciences, and the law, “race” has no 
reliable definition or real meaning.  Moreover, it is a pernicious concept that has been 
used to suggest that human beings can be divided into subspecies, some of which are 
morally, intellectually, and physically inferior to others.  Thus, care givers should focus 
on more precise and meaningful aspects of human identity rather than on the amorphous 
concept of “race.”81
A. “Race” in the Medical and Social Sciences
As early as 1937 Jacques Barzun wrote that  “[a]mong the words that can be all 
things to all men, the word race has a fair claim to being the most common, the most 
ambiguous, and the most explosive.”82  “Race” has been defined as a biological feature;83
a local geographic population;84 a group linked by common descent or origin;85 a 
population connected by a shared history, nationality, or geographic distribution;86 a 
“subspecies”;87 and a social and political construct.88  The word “race” has also been used 
81
 For a more extensive discussion of these arguments, see Hoffman, supra note 18.
82 JACQUES BARZUN, RACE A STUDY IN MODERN SUPERSTITION 3 (1937).
83 JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY:  GENES, RACE , AND HISTORY 108 (1995)
84 DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING “RACE” AND “ETHNICITY” IN AMERICA 47 (2003) (citing the AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1488 (1992)).
85 Id. (citing the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69 (1991)).
86 Id. (citing WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY 968 (1984)).
87
 Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Meanings of “Race in the New Genomics:  Implications for Health 
Disparities Research, 1 YALE J.L. & POLITICS 33, 39 (2001).
88
 Hiroshi Fukarai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 11 LA RAZA 
L.J. 17, 31 (1999); Miranda Oshege McGowan, Diversity of What? in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:  
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 237, 238 (1998).  
13
interchangeably with “ethnicity,” “ancestry,” “culture,” “color,” “national origin,” and 
even “religion.”89
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scientists attempted to classify 
racial groups through assessment of physiological characteristics.  Samuel Morton, a 
prominent Philadelphia physician, collected over 800 skulls from around the world.90
From these, he attempted to calculate the skull capacities of different “races,” not 
surprisingly finding that Caucasians ranked highest, Native Americans ranked lower, and 
Blacks placed last.91  Morton’s results have been discredited by contemporary scholars,
such as Stephen J. Gould, who have pointed out, for example, that skull size corresponds 
to body size and that body size does not necessarily correspond with intelligence level.92
The Nazis focused on the science of “race” with renewed intensity.  In order to 
identify Jews and Gypsies, who were targeted for extermination, they scrutinized hair and 
eye color, the shape of nostrils, the skull, jaws, earlobes, posture, the position of feet at 
rest, and even gait.93  Visitors to contemporary Holocaust museums can often see 
photographs of Nazi doctors measuring various features on people suspected of being
Jews or Gypsies.
Of particular interest in the early twenty-first century, following the completion of 
the Human Genome Project’s mapping of the human genome,94 is the question of 
89 See Soo-Jin Lee, supra note  __, at 54; Fukarai, supra note 88, at 31; ALAIN F. CORCOS, THE MYTH OF 
HUMAN RACES 10- 11 (1997); Donal E. Muir, Race:  The Mythic Root of Racism, in THE CONCEPT OF 
“RACE” IN NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE” 96 (E.  Nathaniel Gates ed. 1997) [hereinafter THE CONCEPT 
OF “RACE”]; Thuy N. Bui, The Difference Between Race and Color:  Implications for Changing the Racial 
Discourse, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 631, 638 (1998); Atwood D. Gaines, Race and Racism, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2193-2194 (Warren Thomas Reich ed. 1995); Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 
F.Supp. 550, 560 (1982) (stating that “the notion of ‘race’ as contrasted with national origin is highly 
dubious”).
A U.S. study involving lay person focus groups concluded that African-Americans are more likely 
to have a broad and malleable understanding of “race,” which includes notions of self-identification and 
culture. Tasha N. Dubriwny et al., Lay Understandings of Race:  Cultural and Genetic Definitions, 7 
COMMUNITY GENETICS 185, 185, 194 (2004).  The study involved 120 participants, including seven focus 
groups consisting of self-identified African Americans, seven groups of self-identified Whites, and one 
group of self-identified Hispanics.  The participants were recruited from urban, suburban, and rural areas in 
Georgia.  Id. at 186.  By contrast, European-Americans were more likely to understand “race” in terms of 
physical characteristics, genetics, and geography.  Id. at 185, 194.
90 WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 18 (1994).
91 Id. (citing SAMUEL MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA (J. Dobson 1839)). Morton attempted to develop a 
scientific method for his study.  He filled the skull cavity with white pepper seeds that he then transferred 
to a tin cylinder from which he read the volume of seeds in cubic inches.  Id.  He also repeated the 
experiment with lead shot.  Id.; Samuel Morton, Observations on the Size of the Brain in Various Races 
and Families of Man, 4 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES OF PHILADELPHIA
221-224 (1848).
92 TUCKER, supra note __, at 19-20.  Stephen J. Gould reanalyzed Morton’s original measurements and 
found many serious errors, miscalculations, and omissions.  He published his conclusions in Stephen J. 
Gould, Morton’s Ranking of Races by Cranial Capacity, 200 SCIENCE 503, 503-09 (1978) and GOULD, 
supra at 50-69.  See also, JOSEPH L. GRAVES JR., THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES:  BIOLOGICAL THEORIES 
OF RACE AT THE MILLENIUM 46-47 (2001).
93
 Judy Scales-Trent, Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany:  the Targeting Process, 
23 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 259, 279 (2001). 
94
 The Human Genome Project is an international research effort whose goal is to analyze the structure of 
DNA in human beings and other living creatures.  Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note __, at 849.
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whether “race” is a genetically valid concept.  Scientists estimate that human beings share 
98.56 percent of their genes with chimpanzees.95  Human beings have approximately 
30,000 to 35,000 genes,96 and 99.9 percent of genes are identical in all individual s.97
While there is variation in the remaining one tenth of a percent, ninety to ninety-five 
percent of variations, which are called alleles,98 are found at equal rates in every “racial” 
population.99  Consequently, only five to ten percent of all genetic variations (in the one-
tenth of a percent of genes that actually vary) are distributed along geographical or 
continental lines.100  This can be explained by the fact that human beings had to adapt to 
very different climates in different regions, and certain features, such as light or dark 
skin, are advantageous for particular environmental conditions.101
Recently, researchers have been able to classify individuals into clusters based on 
similarities in particular sections of their genetic codes, and these classifications
correspond statistically to the “races” by which those tested identified themselves.  One 
study, led by Neil Risch, involved 3,636 subjects who identified themselves as White, 
African American, East Asian, and Hispanic.102 Researchers analyzed three hundred 
twenty six microsatellite markers in their DNA samples and found that the analysis 
produced four major clusters that overwhelmingly corresponded to the subjects’ self-
identified “race.”103 These results, however, can be achieved only if the study includes 
participants whose recent ancestors all come from one distinct geographic area.104
95
 J.W. Jamieson (no first name provided), The Reality of Race:  Contra Biondi and Rickards, 42 MANKIND 
QUARTERLY 389, 399 (2002).
96
 Guttmacher & Collins, supra note __, at 1514.  
97
 David Rotman, Genes, Medicine, and the New Race Debate, TECH. REV. (June 2003), at 41, 42.
98
 An allele is an “alternative form of a gene.”  Guttmacher & Collins, supra note __, at 1513.
99
 Richard S. Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1166, 1167 (2003); Noah A. 
Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298 SCIENCE  2381, 2381 (2002).
100
 Michael J. Bamshad, Human Population Genetic Structure and Inference of Group Membership, 72 AM. 
J. HUM. GENET. 578, 578 (2003); Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic variation, classification 
and ‘race,’ 36 NATURE GENET. SUPP. S28, S29 (2004) (stating that “~90% of total genetic variation would
be found in a collection of individuals from a single continent, and only ~10% more variation would be 
found if the collection consisted of Europeans, Asians and Africans”).
101 See Kelly Owens & Mary-Claire King, Genomic Views of Human History, 286 SCIENCE 451, 453 (1999) 
(explaining that difference in skin and hair color, hair texture and facial features may be attributable to 
“differential selection by climate in various parts of the world”); Wang & Sue, supra note __, at 39 
(“People from local population groups are typically more closely related than are members of groups who 
live greater distances apart”);  Ossorio & Duster, supra note __, at 116 (stating that human “physical traits 
vary gradually, with groups that are close geographic neighbors being more similar than groups that are 
geographically separated”).
102
 Hua Tang et al., Genetic Structure, Self Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in Case-Control 
Association Studies, 76 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 268, 269-270 (2005).
103 Id. at 268, 273-74.  Only five subjects (0.14%) had genetic clustering indicative of a “racial” identity 
different from the one they had listed.
104 Id. at 273-274 (acknowledging that the study underrepresented “individuals with recent mixed ancestry” 
and that clustering success depends on “the homogeneity within groups relative to distance between 
groups” as well as indicating that the study’s Hispanic population was recruited from one location in Texas 
and consisted only of Mexican Americans).   See also, Vence L. Bonham et al., Race and Ethnicity in the 
Genome Era, 60 AM PSYCH. 9, 12 (2005); Duster, supra note __, at 1050 (critiquing studies of human 
genetic diversity); Joseph L. Graves, What We Know and What We Don’t Know:  Human Genetic Variation 
and the Social Construction of Race, available at http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Graves/ (posted April 25, 
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Furthermore, the clustering can only be achieved through examination of microsatellites, 
which constitute a particular “class of non-functional DNA” that are “not typical of 
genes” but are selected because they are “`maximally informative’ about group 
differences.”105
Significantly, among the five to ten percent of variants in the tenth of a percent of 
variable genes that seem to be distributed differentially between geographical 
populations, there are no variants that are found in all members of one population group 
and not in any members of a different population group.106 In addition, commentators 
emphasize that intra-group genetic variation is dramatically greater than inter-group 
variation.107  Furthermore, Black people originating in Africa demonstrate more genetic 
variation than do people with recent ancestry from any other continent, so that two Black 
individuals are likely to be more dissimilar genetically than two members of any other 
“race.”108
Moreover, variation in genetic makeup and physical features is gradual and 
continuous, so it is impossible to demarcate where one “race” ends and another begins.109
For example, skin color, produced by a pigment called melanin,110 slowly changes from 
one region to another so that people whose geographic distance from one another is small 
2005).  This last piece is part of a web forum entitled Is Race “Real”? organized by the Social Science 
Research Council.  The author explains the following:
…the sampling schemes used in studies of human genetic variation limit their interpretation.  To 
accurately represent the genetic diversity of the world’s people would require a systematic 
collection along geographic distance between world regions.  In addition, within each region, 
suitable numbers of individuals would have to be examined, particularly to discover genetic 
variants that are present in low frequency.  For example, studies by American drug companies 
often recruit people with ancestry from three regions, African Americans (representing sub-
Saharan Africa), European Americans (representing various parts of Europe), and various Asian 
American groups.  Sampling in this way ensures that individuals from these specific regions will 
cluster into three groups, simply because individuals from other portions of the spectrum of human 
genetic variation have been excluded from the study. 
105
 Richard C. Lewontin, Confusions About Human Races, available at 
http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Lewontin/ (posted April 20, 2005).  The article is part of a web forum 
entitled Is Race “Real”? organized by the Social Science Research Council.
106
 Leda Cosmides et al., Perceptions of race, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 173, 173 (April 2003); 
Vence L. Bonham et al., supra note __, at 12.
107
 Alan H. Goodman, Why Genes Don’t Count (for Racial Differences in Health), 90 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 
1699, 1700 (2000); Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Race, Ethnicity, and Genomics:  Social 
Classifications as Proxies of Biological Heterogeneity, 12 GENOME RESEARCH 844, 848 (2002), available 
at www.genome.org/cgi/doi/10.1101/gr.99202; Marcus W. Feldman et al., A genetic melting-pot, 424 
NATURE 374, 374 (2003) (stating “that most genetic diversity occurs within groups, and that very little is 
found between them”).
108
 Ossorio & Duster, supra note __, at 118.
109
 Goodman, supra note __, at 1700; Seymour Garte, The Racial Genetics Paradox in Biomedical 
Research and Public Health, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 421, 421 (2002) (“On a genetic level, human variation 
is a smooth continuum with very little evidence for sharp racially defined heterogeneities”); Wang & Sue, 
supra note __, at 39 (“physical anthropologists and geneticists agree that traits (e.g. skin color) do not 
cluster in rigidly bounded populations but gradually change in frequency from one geographic region to 
another).
110
 Richard A. Sturm et al., Human Pigmentation Genetics:  The Difference Is Only Skin Deep, 20 
BIOESSAYS 712, 712 (1998).  See also, THE BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 262 (1990).  
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tend to look more alike than those living far apart.111 Also, individuals who share skin 
color often have radically different ancestries, as is the case for sub-Saharan Africans, 
New Guinea highlanders, and Australian aborigines, so that skin color, as a proxy for 
“race,” is an extremely unreliable indicator.112
Like medical scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have long debated the 
significance of “race.”113 The American Anthropological Association (AAA) issued a 
1997 statement urging the federal government to discontinue its use of the term “race” in 
the gathering of data, because “‘race’ has been scientifically proven to not be a real, 
natural phenomenon.”114  This position was articulated even more emphatically in 1998, 
when the AAA wrote that “[t]he ‘racial’ worldview was invented to assign some groups 
to perpetual low status, while others were permitted access to privilege, power, and 
wealth.”115
In 2003, the American Sociological Association (ASA) issued its own statement 
on “race.”116  The ASA noted that “race” has a significant impact on individuals’ 
educational opportunities, employment, health status, place of residence and treatment 
within the social justice system.117  Consequently, the organization urged the continued 
pursuit of scholarship concerning “race,” asserting that “[r]efusing to acknowledge the 
fact of ‘racial’ classification, feelings, and actions, and refusing to measure their 
consequences will not eliminate “racial” inequalities.  At best, it will preserve the status 
quo.”118  The ASA, however, did not address the biological validity of “race” or attempt 
to define the concept’s meaning.
B. Race and the Law
During the eras of slavery and segregation, state legislatures struggled to create 
bright line rules in order to categorize people as White and Black.119  Different states 
developed the one-quarter rule, the one-eighth rule, the one-sixteenth rule, the one-thirty-
111
 Goodman, supra note __, at 1700.  See also, Bamshad, supra note __, at 587 (Acknowledging that 
“[o]ur analysis is based on samples from regions of Africa, Asia, and Europe that are widely separated from 
one another.  Accordingly, these samples also maximize the degree of genetic variation among 
populations.”).
112
 Bamshad, supra note __, at 587.
113
 Matt Cartmill, The Status of the Race Concept in Physical Anthropology,  100 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 
651, 652 (1999) (detailing the arguments of proponents and opponents of the “race” concept); Audrey 
Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is Real, 60 AM. 
PSYCH. 16 (2005) (reviewing the origins of the concept of race from anthropological and historical 
perspectives and arguing for the continued assessment of racial and ethnic inequality).
114 American Anthropological Association Response to OMB Directive 15:  Race and Ethnic Standards for 
Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting (Sept. 1997), available at 
http://www.aaanet.org/gvt/ombdraft.htm.  The Association suggested the substitution of inquiries 
concerning “ethnicity” or “ethnic group.”  Id.
115
 American Anthropological Association Statement on “Race,” May 17, 1998, available at 
http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm.  
116
 American Sociological Association, The Importance of Collecting Data and Doing Social Scientific 
Research on Race (2003).
117 Id.
118 Id. at Executive Summary.
119
 PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950) (detailing the laws of all the states, 
including their definitions of “Negro”).
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second rule, and the infamous one drop rule.120  Thus, a person could be considered 
White in one state and Black in another.
The courts also struggled to define who was White and who was non-White for 
purposes of determining questions of status, rights, and benefits.121  Predictably, the 
courts did not construct any systematic methodology for making these determinations.122
A published study of sixty-eight nineteenth century cases that were appealed to Southern 
state supreme courts showed that “race” was often determined as much by the way an 
individual “performed Whiteness” as by appearance, “blood,” or other presumably 
scientific evidence.123  Thus, courts often called for “reputation evidence,” judging men 
by their exercise of good citizenship, gentleman-like behavior, and fulfillment of 
obligations in the public sphere and judging women by their apparent purity and moral 
virtue.124
The census provides a dramatic example of the fluidity of “racial” categories.
The choices listed in answer to the questions about the respondent’s “race” have changed 
from decade to decade since 1870.125  In 1870 the list included only white, colored, 
Chinese, and Indian.126  In 2000, respondents could choose from the following “racial” 
categories:  “White,” “Black, African Am., or Negro,” “Asian Indian,” “Chinese,” 
“Filipino,” “Japanese,” “Korean,” Vietnamese,” “Native Hawaiian,” “Guamanian or 
Chamorro,” “Samoan,” “Other Pacific Islander,” “Other Asian,” and “Some other 
race.”127  It is noteworthy that many of these categories are not “races” in the traditional 
sense, but rather, refer to national origin (e.g. Korean, Japanese) or state/territory of 
origin (e.g. Native Hawaiian, Guamanian).  “Hispanic” is not considered a “race” for 
purposes of the census,128 but rather an “ethnicity”129 and is addressed in a separate 
question concerning Hispanic identity.130
120
 State v. Treadaway, 52 So. 500, 502-10 (La. 1910); Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, Comment:  “What Are 
You?”:  Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 463, 473-74 (2000).
121 See e.g. Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 143 (1806) (holding that appellees, who were of 
Native American descent, were entitled to freedom).
122
 Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race in Twentieth-Century 
America, J. AM. HISTORY 44, 51 (June 1996) (asserting that “the criteria used to determine who fit in which 
category were more notable for their malleability than for their logical consistency”).
123
 Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness:  Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 
108 YALE L.J. 109, 120, 182-185 (1998).  The cases involved criminal prosecutions, inheritance disputes, 
slaves suing for their freedom, slander claims, and slaveholders suing those who allegedly assisted runaway 
slaves passing as White.  In each case the “racial” identity of a person was disputed, and a determination of 
whether the person was White or Black was relevant to the outcome of the litigation.  Id. at 120-121.
124 Id.
125
 For a general history of the census, see MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS:  A SOCIAL 
HISTORY (1988); THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS (William Alonso & Paul Starr eds. 1986).
126 DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING “RACE” AND “ETHNICITY” IN AMERICA 56 (2003). 
127
 U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, available at 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html [hereinafter 2000 Census].  Ninety-seven percent of those 
who marked “some other race” indicated that they were Hispanic.  ELIZABETH M. GREICO & RACHEL C. 
CASSIDY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 3 (2001) at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf. 
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 2000 Census; U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 1990 [hereinafter 1990 Census].
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 For a discussion of  the term “ethnicity” see infra note 147.
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 2000 Census, supra note __.
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The categorization of people of mixed “race” has also constituted a conundrum 
for the Census Bureau. Until 1980, “multi-racial” individuals were required to identify 
themselves by the “race” of their non-White parent.131  In 1990, those who wrote “Black-
White” in response to the inquiry about “race” were identified as Black, and those who 
wrote “White-Black” were classified as White.132   The 2000 census finally included the 
option of self-identification by more than one “race.”133  Almost seven million Americans 
chose two or more “races” by which to describe themselves.134  According to the Census 
Bureau, however, seventy-five percent of those who now identify themselves as Black 
could also correctly claim multiracial origins.135  In addition, according to scientists, on 
average, African-Americans have an admixture of ten to twenty percent white genetic 
ancestry, based on familial lineage.136
C. Shifting the Focus Away from “Race”
When scrutinized carefully and studied through the lens of a number of 
disciplines, the concept of “race” has no coherent meaning.  Moreover, it is a pernicious
concept that suggests that human beings can be divided into subspecies, some of which 
are morally, intellectually, and physically superior to others.137  This misconception has 
led to the oppression, subjugation, and even extermination of millions of people, as 
evidenced by genocides such as the Nazi Holocaust and the slaughter in Rwanda.138
131
 Scales-Trent, supra note __, at 285.
132 Id.
133 YANOW, supra note __, at 72.  
134See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU AMERICAN FACTFINDER, RACE, COMBINATIONS OF TWO RACES, AND NOT 
HISPANIC OR LATINO: 2000, supra note __.  More specifically, the responses are as follows: Two or more 
races - 6,826,228; Two races – 6,368,075; White: Black or African American – 784,764; White: American 
Indian and Alaska Native – 1,082,683; White: Asian – 868,395; White: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander – 112,964; White: Some other race – 2,206,251; Black or African American: American Indian and 
Alaska Native – 182,494; Black or African American: Asian – 106,782; Black or African American: Native 
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander – 7,328; American Indian and Alaska Native: Some other race –
93,842; Asian: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander – 138,802; Asian: Some other race – 249,108; 
Native Hawaiian and  other Pacific Islander: Some other race – 35,108; Three or more races – 458,153.  
For a discussion of census data concerning Hispanics, see GREICO & CASSIDY, supra note __.
135
 Bowser, supra note __.
136
 Esteban J. Parra et al., Estimating African American Admixture Proportions by Use of Population-
Specific Alleles, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 1839, 1839 (1998) (finding that European genetic ancestry in ten 
U.S. populations of African descent ranges from 6.8% in Jamaicans to 22.5% in New Orleans); Tang, supra
note __, at 268.
137
 Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Review Essay:  Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747 (1994) 
(noting that physical traits are often associated with moral characteristics); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455 
(2002) (discussing the theory that “race consciousness breeds a culture of inferiority, victimization, and 
helplessness among persons of color”); Ossorio & Duster, supra note __, at 119 (stating that “[p]eople 
often interact with each other on the basis of their beliefs that race reflects physical, intellectual, moral, or 
spiritual superiority or inferiority”).
138 See AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N, RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15:  RACE AND ETHNIC STANDARDS 
FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING, http://www.aaanet.org/gvt/ombdraft.htm
(Sept. 1997) (referring to “the Holocaust, slavery, and the extirpation of American Indian populations).
19
Even in contemporary intellectual circles, some are promoting theories 
concerning the inferiority of the Black “race.”139  For example, in 1994, Richard 
Herrnstein and Charles Murray published a book called The Bell Curve:  Intelligence and 
Class Structure in American Life,140 which focused on the fact that on average, African-
Americans score fifteen or sixteen points lower than Whites on IQ tests.141  Instead of 
critiquing the validity of IQ tests or the environmental factors that might contribute to the 
scoring disparities,142 the authors concluded that this population simply was less  
intelligent than others.  Furthermore, the authors asserted that the ranks of the destitute, 
the criminal, the unemployed, those bearing children out of wedlock, and the socially 
maladjusted are populated by the unintelligent, and consequently, by a disproportionate 
number of African-Americans.143
A second book, written by Michael Levin, Why Race Matters, went a step 
further.144  The book argued that African-Americans are not only typically less intelligent 
than Whites, but also are more aggressive, assertive, and impulsive than Caucasians.145
Furthermore, according to the author, Blacks have a different moral orientation from 
Whites, are more likely to commit crimes, suffer from an absence of “conscience” and 
self-monitoring, and have less free will than Whites.146
It should be emphasized that I do not argue that individuals should stop thinking 
of themselves as African-American, White, Hispanic, Jews, etc.  These identities are 
central and empowering for many people, and I am not arguing that they should be 
expunged.  However, deeming them to be “race” designations is not useful.  More 
accurately, these relate to people’s continent of origin, color, national origin, religion, and 
culture.
Moreover, because “race” is an incoherent term that eludes clear definition and 
because its use reinforces misconceptions about biological differences among human 
populations, it should not be the focus of medical inquiry. Rather, in designing research 
and providing care, health professionals interested in a patient’s background should 
139 See Condit & Bates, supra note __, at 98 (stating that “even today, beliefs in genetic variation among 
different ‘races’ are routinely used by racists as evidence in favor of discriminatory programs or against 
programs that ameliorate historical and structurally based discrimination”).
140 RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:  INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS 
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE  118-120 (1994).
141 Id. at 276.
142 See THE BELL CURVE WARS (Steven Fraser ed. 1995) (criticizing Herrnstein and Murray for engaging in 
distortion of data and political advocacy rather than objective, scientific analysis); Robert J. Sternberg et 
al., Intelligence, Race, and Genetics, 60 Am. PSYCH. 46, 52, 57 (2005) (explaining that “[a]lthough 
attempts have been made to establish genes for intelligence . . .  none have been conclusively identified,” 
that intelligence is “ill defined,” and that “studies currently indicating alleged genetic bases of racial 
differences in intelligence fail to make their point”); David C. Rowe, Under the Skin, 60 AM. PSYCH. 60 
(2005) 
143 HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note __, at 25-27, 63-64.
144 MICHAEL LEVIN, WHY RACE MATTERS:  RACE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT THEY MEAN  (1997).
145 Id. at 213.
146 Id. at 213, 322.  See also, J. Philippe Rushton, Construct Validity, Censorship, and The Genetics of 
Race, AM. PSYCH., January 1995, at 231, 242-247 (defending the concepts of “race” and “race” differences 
based on what the author finds to be reliable evidence of differences in “brain size, IQ, violent crime, 
testosterone, sexuality, and AIDS.”).
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consider a combination of factors, among which might be an individual’s ancestry, socio-
economic status, genetic make-up, health habits, cultural beliefs, and others.147
Generally, however, no single aspect of a person’s identity should be the sole basis for 
research or therapeutic decisions.
The term “race” obfuscates social discourse, policy-making, and medical 
decision-making because it subsum es so many different meanings.  In the following 
section this Article will analyze the specific hazards of “racially-tailored” research and 
therapeutic practices.  
IV 
THE DANGERS OF “RACIAL PROFILING” IN MEDICINE
A. Medical Mistakes
Reliance on the concept of “race” can lead to unfortunate medical mistakes, 
which in turn, can generate medical malpractice claims.148 The problem is obvious in the 
diagnostic setting.  If sickle cell anemia is thought of only as a “racial” disease that 
affects African-Americans, doctors will miss diagnoses in people with ancestry from 
Greece, Italy, and the Arabian Peninsula, who are also vulnerable to the illness.149  If 
cystic fibrosis is perceived as a disease that affects only people of Northern European 
descent, it will go undiagnosed in Black patients.150  Similarly, a recent study examined 
counseling concerning testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are largely associated with 
147
 The concept of  “ethnicity,” which is often substituted for “race,” also has no fixed meaning and would 
not be a significant improvement over “race.”  Id. at 1148-49.  To illustrate, one source quotes the 
following definitions of “ethnicity,” found in a variety of dictionaries:
Of or pertaining to a social group . . . on the basis of complex, often variable 
traits including religious, linguistic, ancestral, or physical characteristics.  
(American Heritage Dictionary 1975, p. 450)
1a. Of or pertaining to sizable groups of people sharing a common and 
distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage.  (American 
Heritage Dictionary 1992, p. 630)
Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological.  (Oxford English 
Dictionary 1971, p. 313)
2a. Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological.  Also, 
pertaining to or having common racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic 
characteristics…; hence (U.S. colloq), foreign, exotic.  (Oxford English 
Dictionary 1991, p. 423)  Of or relating to a religious, racial, national or cultural 
group.  (Webster’s II New Riverside University 1984, p. 445)
YANOW, supra note __, at 47.
148
 In an ordinary medical malpractice case the plaintiff will allege that the health care provider was 
negligent in that she failed to use due care under the circumstances, thereby injuring the patient.  MARCIA 
M. BOUMIL & DAVID J. SHARPE, LIABILITY IN MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 43 (2004); Crossley, supra 
note __, at 244 (explaining that malpractice suits are based on allegations that the physician “failed to 
conform to the standard of care” for “treating patients with the plaintiff’s condition”).
149 See Kahn, supra note 9, at 139.
150 See Richard S. Garcia, The Misuse of Race in Medical Diagnosis, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 9, 2003, 
at B15 (relating the story of an African-American girl whose cystic fibrosis was not diagnosed until she 
reached the age of eight because the disease is much more common among Whites than among Blacks and 
thus her doctors overlooked its possibility in her case).
21
Ashkenazi Jewish women.151  It found that African American women with a first or 
second degree relative who had suffered breast or ovarian cancer were far less likely to 
get counseling concerning testing for the genetic abnormality than White women, even 
though their risk of having BRCA1/2 was no smaller.152
The same concern applies to the treatment setting.  Under the currently approved 
FDA label, individuals who appear to be non-Black might not be prescribed BiDil, even 
though they could benefit from it.153 Therapies that are developed in the future could 
similarly be tested on only a limited population group and, therefore, not be validated for 
all those who could be aided by them.
Because genetic variations are shared by multiple populations, though at times
they appear in different frequencies, “race” is a crude and unreliable predictor of how an 
individual will respond to a particular therapy.154 Furthermore, treatment responses are 
often explained by both genetic and environmental influences, including poor diet, 
poverty, and excessive stress, which cross population lines.155  Consequently, it is 
inappropriate to make facile assumptions about medical treatment and prognosis based on 
“race.”
Furthermore, even if “race” were somehow a relevant variable, it is often difficult 
to accurately determine a person’s “race.”  Health care providers often judge “race”
identity through personal observation or through the patient’s self-identification.156
Because of the growing mixed-origin phenomenon in the Untied States, both of these 
methods can be very misleading.  Individuals who look White can have eighty percent 
West African origins according to their genetic profiles, and those who look Black can 
151
 Katrina Armstrong, et al., Racial Difference in the Use of BRCA1/2 Testing Among Women With a 
Family History of Breast or Ovarian Cancer, 293 JAMA 1729, 1734 (2005) (explaining that in the study’s 
sample of “women with a first- or second-degree relative with breast or ovarian cancer, the predicted 
probability of a BRCA1/2 mutation differed very little between African American and white women”).  For 
background concerning BRCA 1 and 2 testing see Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The Genetic 
“Quick Fix,” and The Jewish Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 98 (1997); Jacqueline Stevens, Racial 
Meanings and Scientific Methods:  Changing Policies for NIH-Sponsored Publications Reporting Human 
Variation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1033, 1044 (2003).
152 Id. __, at 1729.
153 See Saul, supra note __, at C2.
154 See supra Part III.A; Jorde & Wooding, supra note __ at S32.
155 See Nancy Krieger, If “race” is the answer, what is the question? –on “race,” racism, and health: a 
social epidemiologist’s perspective,” available at http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Krieger/ (posted April 
20, 2005 as part of  Is Race “Real”?, a web forum organized by the Social Science Research Council) 
(stating that “[t]he evidence that health varies by socioeconomic position within all US racial/ethnic groups 
. . . is substantial and longstanding), citing, among others,  David R. Williams and  Chiquita Collins, US 
socioeconomic and racial differences in health:  patterns and explanations” 21 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 349 
(1995); G. Davey Smith, Learning to live with complexity:  ethnicity, socioeconomic position, and health in 
Britain and the United States, 90 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1694, 1697 (2000); Nancy Krieger et al., Painting 
a truer picture of US socioeconomic and racial/ethnic health inequalities:  The Public Health Disparities 
Geocoding Project, 95 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 312, 314 (2005).
156
 Wang & Sue, supra note __, at 43.  Some physicians may feel uncomfortable asking patients about their 
“racial” identity or might believe that their patient’s “race” is obvious and therefore not ask about it.
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have primarily European ancestry.157  Therefore, those who look White or Black to a 
physician may not be so genetically, and those who experience themselves as African-
American or Caucasian and self identify as such, may be otherwise in genetic terms.
It follows that “racial profiling” is also alarming in the research context.158  If 
researchers test a new drug combination only on members of one “race,” the outcome
will be flawed.  First, if the subject population is based on individual self-identification, 
the study’s results could be skewed because many of the participants will actually be of 
mixed origins or predominantly of ancestry other than that which they reported.159
Second, if researchers test a treatment only on one population because of academic, 
commercial, or regulatory pressures or in order to facilitate recruitment or save costs and 
do not refine their research to determine exactly who will benefit from the therapy 
regardless of “race,” they would not be serving the general patient community as ably as 
possible.160
B. Stigmatization and Discrimination
Public perception that scientific evidence has established that a particular “race” 
is more vulnerable to life-threatening illnesses than others or does not respond to 
medications that cure others may reinforce negative race-based stereotypes and 
misconceptions.161  Particular populations may be seen as diseased or incurable, which 
could fuel the belief that there are inferior human subspecies and biological differences 
among “races.”
To illustrate, when testing was first developed for the BRCA1/2 genetic 
abnormalities, there was  concern among some Jewish advocates that it would lead to 
stigmatization.  Commentators expressed anxiety that Jews would be generally 
considered to have defective DNA or bad genes, and this possibility raised the specter of 
the Holocaust and Nazi claims about Jewish inferiority in some minds.162
157
 Ossorio & Duster, supra note __, at 118, citing Flavia C. Parra et al., Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, USA 100, 177-82 (2003) and M.D. Shriver et al., Skin pigmentation, biogeographical 
ancestry and admixture mapping, 112 HUMAN GENETICS 387-399 (2003).
158 See Sharona Hoffman & Jessica W. Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, __ U. PITT. L. REV. __ (2005) 
(discussing potential claims against Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) that improperly approve research 
studies).
159
 Bowser, supra note __, at 1113-1114 (indicating that according to the Census Bureau, approximately 
75% of people who self-identify as Black could also consider themselves “multiracial”).
160 See Bloche, supra note __ at 2035-2037 (discussing the BiDil trial); Neil & Craigie, supra note __, at 
15.  See also supra Part II.C for discussion of the academic, commercial, and regulatory incentives for the 
pursuit of “racially-tailored” research.
161Neil & Craigie, supra note __, at 15. 
162
 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Concern Among Jews Is Heightened As Scientists Deepen Gene Studies, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 22, 1998 at A24; Deborah J. Bowen et al., Jewish Identity and Intentions to Obtain Breast 
Cancer Screening, 9 CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY 79, 85 (2003) 
(mentioning “fear of genetic stigmatization”); Lisa Soleymani Lehmann et al., A population-based study of 
Ashkenazi Jewish women’s attitudes toward genetic discrimination and BRCA 1/2 testing, 4 GENETICS IN 
MED. 346348 (2003) (reporting that 13% of Jewish women surveyed “believed that BRCA 1/2 testing will 
lead to increased anti-Semitism”).  There is no evidence that these fears have become justified thus far.
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Likewise, a study of lay people’s attitudes towards “racially varied
pharmacogenomics,”163 revealed a significant amount of suspicion concerning “race-
based prescription” and a preference for individualized genetic testing to determine the 
best course of treatment.164 The practice of basing treatment decisions on “race” was 
viewed as unwelcome “racial profiling.”165
Stigmatization, in turn, can lead to discrimination in the workplace, and 
elsewhere.166 Some employers may seek to avoid hiring or promoting members of 
certain “races” because of a fear that they are at high risk of suffering from life-
threatening diseases (e.g. cancer) or that they will be untreatable with conventional 
medicine if they are stricken with serious illnesses (e.g. heart disease).  Employers will be 
concerned about excessive absenteeism, low productivity, and high insurance costs due to 
above-average medical expenses.167
More sophisticated employers may try to avoid biased assumptions and actually 
test at-risk populations for the presence of genetic abnormalities but may exclude 
individuals from employment opportunities based on a misunderstanding of test 
results.168 In several documented cases employers singled out Black individuals for 
testing for the sickle cell trait, that is, for carrying one copy of the sickle cell gene, even 
though carrier status has absolutely no adverse health implications.169  From the early 
1970s until 1981, the U.S. Air Force Academy excluded all Blacks with the sickle cell 
trait, and commercial air carriers did the same until well into the 1980s.170
In the late 1990s, litigation was brought to challenge another employer’s program 
of collecting blood samples from Black employees and testing them for the sickle cell 
trait without disclosing that this was the intent of the blood test.171  The Ninth Circuit 
163
 Jennifer L. Bevan et al., Informed lay preferences for delivery of racially varied pharmacogenomics, 5 
GENETICS IN MEDICINE 393 (2003).
164 Id. at 393, 398.
165 Id. at 398.  For a discussion of other studies about attitudes concerning “racial profiling” in medicine see
Condit & Bates, supra note __, at 100-101
166
 Bevan et al., supra note __, at 398; Kahn, supra note __, at 141.
167
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, 
sex, and religion.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).  Employers might, however, consider it worthwhile to 
violate the law and risk prosecution because employment discrimination cases, based on the subjective 
intent of the employer, are very difficult to prove.  See Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and 
Job-Relatedness:  How to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 KANSAS L. 
REV. 517, 552-55 (2001) for discussion of reasons for employment discrimination against individuals with 
actual or potential disabilities.
168
 The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employment discrimination based on an individual’s 
disability, record of a disability, or perceived, disability.  However, it does not clearly apply to genetic 
vulnerability to disease.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12112(a) (2000).
169
 Those who carry the genetic variation for this disease do not themselves suffer from the illness.  
However, if they have a child with another carrier, the child could inherit a copy of the gene from each 
parent and thus acquire the ailment.  Kahn, supra note __, at 138.  In fact, having just one copy of the gene 
for sickle cell anemia may actually have health benefits since it is believed to increase the carrier’s 
resistance to malaria, a disease prevalent in Africa.
170
 Kahn, supra note __, at 139.
171 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).  The employer, 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, collected blood and urine samples during a mandatory physical exam and 
tested them for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy.
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held that such testing constituted an invasion of privacy under the California and U.S. 
constitutions and a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because women 
and African-Americans were treated differently from other employees.172   Furthermore, 
according to a workplace testing survey conducted in 2001 by the American Management 
Association, 1.3 percent of employers acknowledged testing employees for sickle cell 
anemia.173  The reported results did not specify whether the employers tested for the 
presence of disease symptoms or for the sickle cell trait and did not indicate whether only 
African-Americans were tested, though that is presumably the case.
Likewise, health insurers selling individual insurance policies174 might use a 
person’s “race” as a mechanism for risk assessment and price-setting despite its 
unreliability.175 They may base decisions about issuing health insurance policies or 
determining premium amounts on general assumptions concerning the person’s “race” 
rather than on individualized assessments.  They could, for example, assume that Black 
customers are generally at increased risk for high blood pressure or cannot be treated with 
inexpensive, conventional therapies for common diseases and, therefore, should be 
charged higher premiums or denied coverage altogether.176
C. Exacerbation of Health Disparities
It is theoretically possible that if the practice of medicine becomes increasingly 
“racially-tailored,” minorities seeking care in largely White communities will be advised 
to go to doctors in other areas, such as economically disadvantaged neighborhoods in the 
inner city, who purportedly have more expertise in treating people of their ancestry.  Just 
as today we have specialists who focus on particular ailments, such as oncologists and 
cardiologists, in the future we could have experts who specialize in treating different 
“races.” Thus, medical care could become more segregated, and disparities could grow 
rather than diminish as a result of the new approach.
Other commentators have further hypothesized that an emphasis on differences 
among “racial” groups could encourage health care givers to provide inferior treatment to 
minorities, as some are already accused of doing.177 If all patients with a particular 
illness cannot be treated the same, and there is no single standard of care, some doctors
might, at least unconsciously, invest more effort and resources in serving White patients, 
172 Id. at 1275.
173 See AM. MGMT. ASS’N, 2001 AMA SURVEY ON WORKPLACE TESTING:  MEDICAL TESTING (2001).
174
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 provides that insurers offering group 
plans cannot deny enrollment or charge higher premiums to any member of the group because of health 
status, medical history, or genetic information.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg (b)(1)(B), and 300gg-1(b)(1)
(2000). The law, however, does not extend to protect those seeking individual insurance plans.  Such 
consumers might be subjected to discrimination in the form of exorbitant premium charges or complete 
denial of coverage.  See Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy:  Comparing the 
Medical, Public Health, and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 280 (2001).  
Approximately ten to fifteen percent of insured have individual policies.  Rothstein & Hoffman, supra, note 
__, at 869.  But see infra Part V.B.5 for discussion of state insurance laws that prohibit “race” 
discrimination.  
175
 Neil & Craigie, supra note __, at 15 (mentioning the possibility of discrimination by insurers).
176 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of “racially-tailored” research, its subtleties, and the controversy that 
surrounds them.  See also supra Part IV.A. and infra Part VI.B, for discussion of the difficulty of 
determining individual “racial” identity.
177
 Condit & Bates, supra note __, at 98.
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who can be given familiar, traditional treatments.  “Race-based” medicine could also 
intensify the distrust that some African-Americans feel towards the medical profession in 
the aftermath of the Tuskegee syphilis trial and other scandals.178  African-Americans 
might absorb the message that medical professionals view them as biologically distinct 
from other groups and are looking for ways to exclude them from receiving mainstream, 
standard therapies.
V
VIOLATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
“Race-based” medicine might also violate a variety of legal anti-discrimination 
mandates, including the Constitution, federal laws, state statutes, federal research 
regulations, and National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines. If health care 
professionals and medical researchers rely upon the meaningless notion of “race” rather 
than basing decisions on more accurate and sound classifications, such as ancestry, 
national origin, socio-economic status, health-related habits, or genetic variation, they 
may run afoul of the law in a number of ways that are analyzed below.
A. The Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws
In a thorough and insightful article, Erik Lillquist and Charles Sullivan analyze a 
number of federal anti-discrimination provisions that could be violated by the practice of 
“race-based” medicine.179 Nevertheless, while these laws create potential causes of 
action for individuals subjected to “racial profiling” in medicine, they are not strong 
avenues for redress.  
First, the Constitution’s Equal Protection provisions prohibit state and federal 
governmental entities from denying individuals the “equal protection of the laws.”180
This prohibition would apply to actions by governmental agencies, public hospitals, and 
public research institutions.181 The equal protection mandate might be invoked by 
individuals who feel they are treated differently in a medical setting because of their 
“race.”  
However, plaintiffs asserting equal protection claims against governmental 
actors will face the hurdles of immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment provides that states 
cannot be sued in federal court for constitutional violations.182  Eleventh Amendment 
178 Id.  For a description of the Tuskegee syphilis trial and other medical research abuses see Sharona 
Hoffman, Continued Concern:  Human Subject Protection, The Institutional Review Board, and Continuing 
Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 729-31 (2001).
179
 Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note __, at 443.
180
 U.S. CONSTIT. amend. V, XIV § 1.  See also, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) 
(explaining that while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause is understood to impose an identical equal protection mandate on the federal government).
181
 Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note __, at 443.  Equal Protection claims are enforced through actions 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or as Bivens actions pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
182 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI.  The text reads as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
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immunity has been interpreted to extend to cases asserting constitutional claims in state 
court as well183 and covers agencies and other arms of the state.184  The amendment bars 
all suits for damages or retroactive relief against state governments that are sued by any 
party other than a different state or the federal government.185  Likewise, the doctrine of 
federal sovereign immunity protects the United States from being sued without its 
consent.186  Thus, state or federal institutions, such as hospitals or clinics, could not be 
sued for constitutional violations.187
In addition, the defense of qualified immunity shields federal and state 
government officials who are performing discretionary functions from liability for civil 
damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”188  Consequently, individual 
governmental actors can be held liable only if they could be expected to have known that 
their actions would result in a violation of constitutional rights.  Proving such knowledge 
is difficult, though not impossible.
A second federal law provision that might apply to “racially-tailored” medicine is 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which proscribes “race-based” discrimination with respect to contracts 
involving either public or private parties.189 Section 1981, however, has rarely been 
successfully invoked in health care cases.190 Furthermore, § 1981 plaintiffs must prove 
that the alleged wrong occurred in association with a “contract,” which could be a 
challenging task, especially in the research context.191
Congress can abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, but only if it passes legislation under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives it “power to enforce [that Amendment] by appropriate 
legislation.”  MARK K. BROWN & KIT KINPORTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION UNDER § 1983  196 
(2003).   
183
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that “the powers delegated to Congress under 
Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to 
private suits for damages in state courts”).
184 RICHARD H. FALLON, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 1056 (4th ed. 1996); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department 
of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945).
185 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (6th ed. 2000); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
186 FALLON, ET AL., supra note __, at 1001.
187
 Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, does not extend to local government entities.  FALLON, ET 
AL., supra note __, at 1057;  Monell v. New York Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
188 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  See also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 
(1984) (stating that “[w]hether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the 
objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law”).
189
 The statute provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . “  42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) 
(2003); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to private conduct).
190
 Charles Sullivan, Racial Distinctions in Medicine, 5 D EPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 249, 254-55 (2002); 
Daniels v. Murphy, 528 F.Supp. 2, 5 (D.Okla. 1978) (holding that plaintiffs who filed a wrongful death 
action failed to state a claim under § 1981 because they did not allege racial discrimination by any 
defendant); United States v. Medical Soc’y of S.C., 298 F.Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969) (ruling that § 1981 
applies to a African-American patients’ right to be admitted to a hospital).
191See Roger L. Jansson, Note, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research:  Informed 
Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229, 242-43 (2003) (analyzing whether 
researchers have a special relationship with human subjects and noting that only one court has indicated 
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Third, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 disallows “race” discrimination on 
the part of federally funded programs even if the funding recipient is a private 
institution.192 Nevertheless, Title VI has been held not to apply to doctors receiving 
Medicare payments because they are not federally-funded “programs” as defined by the 
law,193 though hospitals and long-term care facilities receiving federal funds are 
covered.194
Finally, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964195 forbids discrimination and 
segregation in places of public accommodation.196  The provision that defines “a place of 
public accommodation,” however, refers specifically to lodging, eating establishments, 
gasoline stations, and exhibition or entertainment facilities197 but not to medical 
facilities.198 Thus, it is not clear whether health care entities would constitute public 
accommodations under the law.199
In short, federal law provides a number of potential causes of action for those 
aggrieved by “racially-tailored” medicine, but each has its shortcomings.  Thus, 
sources other than the federal civil rights laws may provide stronger protection for 
patients.
B. State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in the Medical Arena
A number of different types of state laws prohibit discrimination by health care 
providers, some of which could apply to “race-based” medicine.200
that the informed consent document might constitute a contract between the investigator and subject in 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001)).
192 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).   The provision reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.  
Doctors receiving Medicare funding, however, are not “programs” under the statute.  Lillquist & Sullivan, 
supra note __, at 445.
193 See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note __, at 445; Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F.Supp. 
1424 (N.D.Ill. 1983).
194
 Bryan v. Koch, 492 F.Supp. 212, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); U.S. v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 970 F.2d 
94, 96 (1992).
195 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2003).
196
 The text reads as follows:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in 
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or 
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2003).
197 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2003).
198 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2003); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
plaintiff lacked standing to assert a Title II claim against a hospital because even if he could prove that he 
suffered covered discrimination, the statute awards only prospective injunctive relief rather than damages, 
and he would not suffer continuing harm); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 CIV. 0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (finding that hospitals are not covered by Title II); United States v. Med. 
Soc’y of S.C., 298 F.Supp. 145, 147-48 (D.S.C. 1969) (holding that a hospital was covered partly because 
it had a cafeteria and snack bar that served interstate travelers food). 
199
 Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note __, at 443.
200 See OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
ASSESSMENT OF STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES AFFECTING THE COLLECTION AND 
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1. Civil Rights Statutes
The majority of states have civil rights statutes that proscribe discrimination 
based on race with respect to public accommodations.  Arizona’s is a typical statute:
No person shall, directly or indirectly, refuse to, withhold from or deny to 
any person… accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof 
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry, nor shall 
distinction be made with respect to any person based on race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin or ancestry in connection with the price or 
quality of any item, goods or services offered by or at any place of public 
accommodation.201
The states’ definitions of “public accommodation” vary.  Twenty states consider 
“all establishments which cater or offer their services, facilities or goods to or solicit 
patronage from the members of the general public” to be places of public 
accommodation.202 One must look to each state’s common law to determine which types 
of health care facilities are covered.
Other states are more specific.  California forbids discrimination “in all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever.”203 Eleven states include clinics and hospitals 
in their statutory definitions of “public accommodation” but exclude private health care 
providers or insurance providers.204  Washington state covers any place “where medical 
service or care is made available,”205 and Nevada specifies that an “office of a provider of 
health care” is a place of public accommodation.206 Finally, the District of Columbia,
Nevada, and Ohio include in their definitions of places of public accommodation insurers 
and insurance offices.207
REPORTING OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DATA BY HEALTH INSURERS AND MANAGED CARE PLANS, available at 
http://omhrc.gov/OMH/sidebar/datastats13.htm#phase2.
201 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442 (West 2004).
202 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441 (West 2004).  See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (Mitchie 
Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63 (West Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502 (1999); 
IDAHO CODE § 67-5902 (Mitchie 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-2-1 (Mitchie 2004); IOWA CODE § 216.2 
(2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2232 (West 
2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2302 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 (West Supp. 
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2, repealed by § 28-1-15 (eff. July 1, 2006) (Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.400 
(2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1 (Mitchie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (1998); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 13-7-3 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (1993); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3 (Mitchie 2002).
203 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2003).
204 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-101 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (l) (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40 
(McKinney 1992); 43 PA. CONST. STAT. § 955 (Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (2002); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 45-9-10 (Law Co-op Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52 (1) (e) (1) (West Supp. 2004).
205 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (West 2002).
206 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.050 (Mitchie 2004).  See also, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A2 (XIV) (Supp. 
2004) (in New Hampshire a “health care provider” is a place of public accommodation).
207 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (24) (Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.050 (Mitchie 2004); 
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-02 (I) (2002).
29
Other state laws are directed specifically at HMOs.  To illustrate, Colorado’s 
statute establishes that “[n]o HMO shall unfairly discriminate against any enrollee based 
on…race.”208
Medical facilities and health care providers who base treatment decisions on their 
assumptions about an individual’s “race” may be guilty of violating these civil rights 
laws if they cause harm by doing so.  A provider who declines to consider various 
therapeutic options because of a patient’s apparent “race” may be a covered entity that is 
engaging in “race-based” discrimination under state law.209
2. Hospital And Medical Facility Licensing Requirements
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas all require that medical 
facilities licensed to operate in the state210 agree to provide nondiscriminatory care.  
Pennsylvania’s statute, for example, mandates that “no provider shall discriminate in the 
operation of a health facility on the basis of race….”211  Rhode Island establishes that 
“[p]ersons and other entities providing health services in the state have a duty to provide 
those services to any person in need of health services without regard to the person’s 
race. . . “ and that violators will be denied certification.212  Other states require 
compliance with Patients’ Bill of Rights laws that prohibit racial discrimination as a 
208
 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 4-7-2 (YYYY); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.22 (4) (West 2005) (“The procedures for 
offering comprehensive health care services . . . will not unfairly discriminate on the basis of age, sex, race 
. . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. I § 19-710 (h) (West 2005) (“The procedures for offering health 
care services . . . may not discriminate unfairly on the basis of age, sex, race . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. 500.3519 (2) (West Supp. 2005) (A health maintenance organization contract . . . shall not 
discriminate on the basis of race . . . .”); N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §10.13.22 (A) (YYYY) (No health care 
insurer or health care facility or provider through which the health care insurer has made arrangements to 
provide health care services shall discriminate against any enrollee by: . . . altering the terms of an existing 
health benefits contract and the quality of health care services rendered or to be rendered because of the 
enrollee’s: gender, race . . . .”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 98-1.11 (YYYY) (requiring that 
each HMO shall not discriminate in service provision on the basis of race); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, r. 
20.0202 (13) (MMM YYYY) (requiring that all contracts between providers and network plan carriers 
contain a provision that the provider “shall not discriminate against members on the basis of race . . . .”); 
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-06-07-05 (YYYY) (prohibiting HMOs from unfairly discriminating against 
enrollees or applicants on the basis of race); S.C. CODE REGS. 69-22 (YYYY) (prohibiting HMOs from 
discriminating against any enrollee or applicant on the basis of race); VA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, 5-210-80 
(C) (1) (YYYY) (prohibiting HMOs from discriminating against any enrollee on the basis of race); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 33-25D-15 (Mitchie 2003) (prohibiting “prepaid limited health service organization[s]” from 
discriminating in the quality of services on the basis of race); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-14a (d) 
(Mitchie Supp. 2005) (prohibiting HMOs from discriminating in the quality of services on the basis of 
race).
209
 Similarly, in some states, an insurer that refuses to cover testing or treatment for an individual may be 
violating civil rights laws.  See infra Part V.B.5.
210
 Licensure is typically required “to protect and promote the public health and welfare through the 
establishment and enforcement of regulations setting minimum standards in the construction, maintenance 
and operation of health care facilities.” 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.801 (a) (West 2003)
211
 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.804 (a) (West 2003).  See also, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 105, § 130.206 
(1994); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.16 (d) (9) (2005) (binding emergency medical services providers
only); R.I. CODE R. 14 090 007 (2003) (requiring only that hospitals do not deny admission based on a 
patient’s race).
212 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-62-11 (1998)
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condition of licensure.213 These statutes bind the facilities at issue even if they are not 
considered places of public accommodation for purposes of civil rights law.
3. Patients’ Bill of Rights Laws
Several states have Patient Bill of Rights laws that prohibit race discrimination 
in health care. Some states passed patient rights laws as individual statutes, 214 while 
others placed patient rights provisions within more comprehensive laws.215  The Florida 
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities is by far the most sweeping law of its kind.  
It provides in part that “[a] patient has the right to impartial access to medical treatment 
or accommodations, regardless of race, national origin, religion, handicap, or source of 
payment.”216 New Jersey’s law guarantees the right “[t]o treatment without 
discrimination as to race…”217 but applies only to patients in hospitals, while other laws 
cover long term care, surgical centers, and home health agencies.218
Patients who are treated differently from others because of “race-based” 
practices and who suffer harm as a result might experience a violation of their rights 
under the law.  Some patients’ rights statutes expressly authorize a private cause of 
action219 or have been deemed by the courts to include a right of private action.220
Other states provide only for administrative enforcement, while still others allow 
for patient grievances but fail to empower state agencies to fine violators or provide 
meaningful relief to aggrieved parties.  In Michigan, while no private right of action 
exists,221 patients are entitled to reimbursement by the offending facility upon an 
administrative finding of a statutory violation.222 Florida requires that copies of the 
213 NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 175, ch. 9, § 006 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (Supp. 2004); N.M. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7.7.2.19 (2005); N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7.8.2.34 (2005); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
10A, r. 13B.3302 (m) (March 2005); R.I. CODE R. 14 090 007 (2003).
214 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2005); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.20201 (West Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
30:13-3 (West Supp. 2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.7 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
3721.13 (A) (3) (West Supp. 2005) (detailing patient rights for nursing home residents).
215 CODE DEL. REGS. 40-700-014 (2004); CODE DEL. REGS. 40-700-037 (2004); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-
03-10.1-10 (6) (a) (5) (1998).
216 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2005).
217 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(p) (West 2004).
218 CODE DEL. REG. 40-700-014 (2004) (long term care); CODE DEL. REG. 40-700-037 (2004) (free 
standing surgical centers); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b (hospitals); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 
10, §405.7 (c) (1996) (hospitals); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03- 10.1 (1998) (home health agencies).
219 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:13-4.2 (West 1997) (providing a cause of action for violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
30:13-1 et. seq., which outlines responsibilities and rights of nursing home residents); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3721.17 (I) (West Supp. 2005) (giving nursing home residents a private cause of action against 
“any person or home” committing a violation of nursing home patient’s bill of rights outlined in OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3721.10 to § 3721.17 (West Supp. 2005)); Sprosty v. Pearlview, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 1180 (ohio 
app. 1995), (holding that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3721.17 (I) permits an award of punitive damages for 
violation of the patient’s bill of rights).  See also, Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients’ 
Bill of Rights: Winners and Losers, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 17, 91-95 (2001).
220 McDonald v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 203 A.D.2d 6; 610 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1994).
221 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20203 (West 2001).
222 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21799c (4) (West 2001) (stating that the Department of Health must 
order a facility in violation of the patient rights law to pay the patient $100.00 or reimburse patient for 
injuries or costs, whichever is greater).
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patient’s bill of rights be available to patients, imposes penalties for those who violate 
this requirement,223 and enables patients to file grievances with the offending health care 
providers or the state licensing agency.224 Hospitals in Kansas must similarly inform 
patients of their rights during admission225 and “establish a mechanism for responding to 
patient complaints.”226 Delaware patients in long term care facilities can report 
mistreatment to the Patient Rights Unit227 or other agencies,228 and medical facilities 
must inform them in writing of their right to do so.229    North Dakota’s statute has a 
more limited scope, applying only to home health agencies and providing that they be 
monitored by the government to ensure compliance with the anti-discrimination 
mandate.230
4. Public Services Regulation
Many states prohibit discrimination on the basis of “race” in the distribution of 
state services, including Medicaid.  Most of these states prohibit discrimination not only 
by state staff at public facilities, but also by any private provider or contractor who 
receives state funds to provide medical services and any health care facilities enrolled as 
state Medicaid providers.231 The statutes’ wording differs to some extent, with different 
laws addressing discrimination in enrollment, the provision of services, access to 
services, or separate treatment practices.232
To illustrate, Arizona mandates that “[a] contractor, provider, and nonprovider 
shall not discriminate against an eligible person or member because of race . . . .”233
Other states similarly prohibit “race” discrimination in the provision of services or denial 
223
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.026 (6) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring health care providers to make a copy of the 
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities available to patients); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.0261 (4) (West 
2002) (providing for an administrative fine if a health care facility does not make the patient’s bill of rights 
available to a patient).
224 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (6) (West Supp. 2005) (stating that a patient can air grievances with the 
facility or provider serving her, as well as with the state licensing agency when a right has been violated).   
225 KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b (10) (YYYY).
226 KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b (10) (b) (YYYY).
227 CODE DEL. REGS. § 40-700-014 (V) (I) (2004) (listing the phone number and address for county Patient 
Rights Units).
228 CODE DEL. REGS. § 40-700-014 (V) (1) (2004) (listing the Division of Public Health, State Human 
Relations Commission, Dept. of Health and Social Services, and Office of Civil Rights addresses to which 
patients can send correspondence regarding discriminatory practices).
229 CODE DEL. REGS. § 40-700-014 (III) (1), (2) (2004).
230 N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03-10.1-10 (6) (a) (5) (2005).
231 See e.g. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 10-2.010 (2002) (“This rule specifies civil rights compliance 
requirements for all health service providers and contractors who provide services for the Department of 
Health and for all hospitals and public health clinics that receive federal financial assistance or 
reimbursements for services provided”); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 560-X-1-.07 (2) (Supp. 1997) (“Compliance 
with Federal Civil Rights and Rehabilitation Acts is required of all providers participating in the Alabama 
Medicaid Program”); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R9-22-513 (2004) (“A contractor, provider, and nonprovider 
shall not discriminate against an eligible person or member because of race .. . .”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
r.350-1-.05 (1989) (“[N]o individual shall be excluded from participation, or be denied benefits, or be 
subjected to any other form of discrimination by the Department or providers of medical assistance, by 
reason of handicap, race, color, sex, age, religion, or national origin”) (emphasis added).
232 See infra note 234.
233 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R9-22-513 (A) (2004).
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of benefits.234  Covered physicians and medical facilities that make therapeutic decisions 
based purely on a patient’s “race” and thereby cause harm, could be acting in violation of 
these laws.
5. Insurance Codes
A few states explicitly prohibit race discrimination by insurers.  Insurers who 
refused to cover diagnostic tests or treatments ordered by a health care provider because 
they did not consider them appropriate for someone of the patient’s race could be deemed 
to have violated these laws.  New Jersey, for example, mandates that insurers may not 
make or permit any policy “which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation or 
discrimination as to race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry…”235
234 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 56-X-1-.07 (Supp. 1997); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 78.130 (2004); ALASKA 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 43.070 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-19-110 (West 2004); CONN. AGENCIES 
REGS. § 17b-262-526 (1) (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 4405 (YYYY); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 22, § 
5509 (2005); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 948 (YYYY); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 5319.1 (2004); D.C. 
MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 5413.1 (2004); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 5618 (2004); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
59G-8.100 (23) (2005); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 350-1-.05 (1989); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 16.03.09.026 
(2003); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1 (West Supp. 2005);  IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 405, r. 5-1-2 
(2005); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-88.2 (3) (e) (2005); IOWA ADMIN CODE r. 441-152.2 (YYYY); KAN. 
ADMIN. REGS. 30-2-1 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.640 (Mitchie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
46:437.11 (West 1999); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 09.36.03 (YYYY); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 09.64.07 
(YYYY); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 09.65.02 (YYYY); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 130, § 450.202 (YYYY); 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit.130, § 501.009 (YYYY); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.7172 (YYYY); MO. CODE 
REGS. Ann. tit. 19, § 10-2.010 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-105 (2004); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.85.402
(YYYY); NEB. ADMIN. CODE 2-001.04 (YYYY); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 72-1.7 (YYYY); N.M. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 302.1 (YYYY); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 515.2 (YYYY); N.C. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, r. 28B.0401 (MM YYYY); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-26-12 (YYYY); OKLA. 
ADMIN. CODE § 317:25-7-25 (YYYY); OR. ADMIN. R. 410-120-1380 (YYYY); OR. ADMIN. R. 461-105-
0010 (YYYY); OR. ADMIN. R. 461-105-0190 (YYYY); 55 PA. CODE § 1101.51 (YYYY); R.I. CODE R. 15 
020 001 (YYYY); S.C. CODE ANN. § 126-125 (Law Co-op. YYYY); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:16:01:18 
(YYYY); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:01:13 (YYYY); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-13-1-.05 (YYYY); 25 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 37.67 (West YYYY); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 39.21 (West YYYY); 25 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 448.207 (West YYYY); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R414-1 (YYYY); VT. CODE R. 13-170-001 (YYYY); 
12 VA ADMIN. CODE § 30-10-970 (West YYYY); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § HFS 104.01 (YYYY); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 42-4-107 (Mitchie 2003).  But cf. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-26-02 (2002) (requiring 
nondiscrimination in admissions only).
235 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4 (7) (c), (d) (West 2004). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5 
(West 2000); (stating that terms of a health care service plan contract may “not be modified, and the 
benefits or coverage of any contract shall not be subject to any limitations, exceptions, exclusions, 
reductions, copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, reservations, or premium, price, or charge differentials, 
or other modifications because of the race…of any contracting party.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304 
(22) (a) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful practice for any insurance company licensed to do business in this 
state to discriminate in any way because of the insured’s race . . . .”); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/424
(West Supp. 2005) (defining unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices as: 
“Making or permitting, in the case of insurance . . . any unfair discrimination between individuals . . . 
because of the race . . . of such insurance risks or applicants.”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 2051.55 (West 
YYYY) (requiring that all health insurance preferred provider agreements contain “A provision stating that 
the provider will provide health care services without discrimination against any beneficiary on the basis of 
. . . ethnicity . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-910 (b) (2002)  (“A health network may not deny health 
care services to an enrollee on the basis of gender, race . . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-12 (Mitchie 
2000) (“No insurer shall, on the basis of the race . . . of any individual or group of persons: . . . treat any 
such applicant or insured differently than any other applicant or insured with respect to the terms, 
conditions, rates, benefits or requirements of any such insurance contract.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
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Nevada’s insurance statute is somewhat narrower and provides that: “[r]isks may 
be classified in any reasonable way for the establishment of rates and minimum 
premiums, except that classifications may not be based on race, color, creed or national 
origin…”236  The statute does not address denial of coverage for particular treatments 
based on a patient’s “race.” However, if an insurer issuing individual policies237
attempted to charge African-Americans as a class higher rates or premiums because they 
were all perceived as more prone to disease or less easily treatable by standard therapy, 
the insurer could be deemed to violate the law.  
Nevertheless, state mandates will not protect patients enrolled in self-funded 
employee benefit plans238 because under a federal law called the ERISA,239 state laws 
regulating insurance are preempted with respect to self-funded plans and cannot be 
enforced.240  This exception is quite consequential because a growing number of 
employers are self-insured.241
C. Violation of Research Regulations and Guidelines
The best source of protection for the American public might be NIH guidelines 
and federal research regulations that will govern many “racially-tailored” research 
studies.  Clinical trials that include only one population or deliberately exclude 
particular population groups could violate NIH and federal agency rules.
1. NIH Policy and Guidelines
Researchers seeking NIH funding who include only members of one population 
in a clinical trial may violate the NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women 
and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research.242  The Guidelines state the following:
1751.18 (2) (West Supp. 2005) (prohibiting any “health insuring corporation, or health care facility or 
provider through which the health insuring corporation has made arrangements to provide health care 
services” from discriminating against anyone in “the quality of health care services rendered” on the basis 
of race); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-6-10(2) (Mitchie 2000) (prohibiting government insurers that 
discriminate on the basis of race from transacting insurance in the state).
236 NEV. REV. STAT. 686B.060 (2003).  See also, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-209 (b) (West 2002); CAL. INS. 
CODE § 10140 (West Supp. 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-14-105 (b) (Mitchie 2003).
237 See supra note 174 and accompanying text for discussion of group versus individual insurance policies.
238
 Employers who choose self funded plans pay their employees’ medical claims on their own rather than 
contracting with a commercial insurer that collects premiums and serves as a third party payer. Every 
medical claim translates into an out-of-pocket expense for these employers.  They are thus known as self-
insured employers. Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in 
GENETIC SECRETS:  PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281, 293 (Mark A. 
Rothstein ed., 1997).
239
 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999).  
240 See Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health Insurance Coverage for 
Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV. 203, 241-243 (1999); FMC Corp. v. 
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (We read the . . . [statute] to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state 
laws that ‘regulat[e] Insurance . . . .’”).
241
 Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in GENETIC SECRETS:  
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281, 293. (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 
1997).  In 1993, ninety-three percent of employers with more than 40,000 employees were self-insured, as 
were eighty-five percent of employers with 5,000-40,000 employees, and thirty-seven percent of those with 
50-199 employees.  Id.
242
 NIH GUIDELINES, supra note __.
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It is the policy of NIH that women and members of minority groups and their 
subpopulations must be included in all NIH-funded clinical research, unless a 
clear and compelling rationale and justification establishes to the satisfaction of 
the relevant Institute/Center Director that inclusion is inappropriate with respect 
to the health of the subjects or the purpose of the research. . . .  Cost is not an 
acceptable reason for exclusion except when the study would duplicate data from 
other sources.243
Researchers who seek to exclude particular minority groups from their clinical 
studies because they are attempting to develop therapy for a different “racial” 
population (e.g. only African-Americans or only Hispanics), risk violation of these 
guidelines and denial of NIH funding.  Investigators would have to show that there are 
valid reasons for excluding all members of a particular minority.  Because so many 
Americans are of mixed ancestral origin and because genetic variations are shared 
across population lines,244 the NIH should rarely, if ever, find a compelling justification 
for invoking the exception to the general rule of inclusion.  The BiDil trial, for example, 
should have been deemed unacceptable if judged under these guidelines because there 
was no evidence that African-Americans are the only individuals who could benefit 
from a combination of BiDil and standard therapy.245
While NIH’s rule of inclusion is laudable, the NIH guidelines also feature a 
more troubling mandate, instructing researchers to report “race/ethnicity differences in 
the intervention effect” in appropriate circumstances.246 The guidelines provide the 
following choices for “ethnic categories”:  Hispanic or Latino and Not Hispanic or 
Latino.247  The choices for “racial categories” are:  American Indian or Alaska Native, 
Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 
White.248  The NIH, therefore, encourages research that focuses on “racial” differences 
and requires analyses of “race-based” treatment response disparities even in research 
that is not intentionally designed to develop “racially-tailored” therapies.  This approach 
has been criticized by other commentators and ought to be rejected.249  It could 
constitute an incentive for sloppy science in which response differences are attributed to 
243 Id.
244 See supra Parts III.A. and III.B.
245 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the BiDil trial.
246 See  NIH GUIDELINES, supra note __ (indicating the circumstances in which sex/gender and ethnic/racial 
analyses must be conducted and stating that “[i]nclusion of the results of sex/gender, race/ethnicity and 
relevant subpopulations analyses is strongly encouraged in all publication submissions”).
247 Id.  It is not clear why Hispanic or Latino are considered “ethnic” categories while other classification 
are considered “racial.”  For a discussion of the term “ethnicity” see supra note 147.
248
 NIH GUIDELINES, supra note __.  The Guidelines further provide that “NIH recognizes the diversity of 
the U.S. population and that changing demographics are reflected in the changing racial and ethnic 
composition of the population.  The terms “minority groups” and “minority subpopulations” are meant to 
be inclusive, rather than exclusive, of differing racial and ethnic categories.”  The categories provided by 
NIH are consistent with those of the Office of Management and Budget Directive No. 15, which lists the 
basic “racial” and ethnic categories that the federal government is to utilize for purposes of statistical, 
administrative, and civil rights compliance reports.  Office of Management and Budget, Standards for 
Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (1997), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/ombdir15.html.
249 See Stevens, supra note __, at 1033-1036; Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note __, at 451-455.
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the subjects’ self-selected “racial” identity without deeper analysis of more specific 
geographic origins, socio-economic conditions, and other factors.
A better alternative is one that has been adopted by several prestigious 
publications, including Nature Genetics and JAMA.  Rather than encourage the use of 
“racial” categorization, these journals require authors who analyze data by sub-
population, to justify their doing so and to explain how they constructed their 
classifications.250 JAMA specifically encourages investigators to measure a number of 
different variables, including “socioeconomic status, education, urban vs. rural location,
or income region by ZIP code” in order to determine the true reasons for the outcome at 
issue.251 In the words of the Nature Genetics editors, “this will raise awareness and 
inspire more rigorous design of genetic and epidemiological studies.”252
2. Federal Research Regulations
The federal research regulation govern a large portion of research studies that are 
conducted in the United States.  The FDA regulations apply to clinical trials that are 
designed to develop new drugs, medical devices, and biological products, such as 
vaccines and blood products.253  Clinical trials that involve treatments other than drugs 
and devices, such as surgery or bone marrow transplants, are not within the jurisdiction 
of the FDA but are subject to HHS regulation if they are “conducted, supported or 
otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency.”254
The federal regulations can be viewed as a further constraint upon “race-based” 
research.  Both the FDA and HHS regulations instruct Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs) that review and approve research projects255 to pay particular attention to the 
selection criteria for human subjects.  Specifically, the regulations provide:
Selection of subjects is equitable.  In making this assessment the IRB should 
take into account the purposes of the research and the setting in which the 
research will be conducted and should be particularly cognizant of the special 
problems of research involving vulnerable populations, such as. . . economically 
or educationally disadvantaged persons.256
Investigators who design “racially-tailored” clinical trials that are federally 
regulated risk violating this mandate by selecting enrollees in an inequitable fashion.  If 
members of only one minority are included in a high-risk study, that minority will 
250 Census, Race and Science, 24 NATURE GENETICS 97, 98 (2000); Winker, supra note __, at 1614 
(encouraging authors who analyze results by race to rely on self-designation but cautioning that such 
analysis has become a “knee jerk reflex” and must be justified).
251
 Winker, supra note __, at 1614.
252 Census, Race and Science, supra note __, at 98.
253 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2005).  See also http://www.fda.gov (describing all items regulated by the FDA).
254
 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005).  
255
 The federal regulations mandate that all research that is conducted, supported, or regulated by HHS, the 
FDA, or another federal agency must be overseen by an IRB, a committee constituted to provide initial 
approval and periodic monitoring for biomedical research studies.  21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101, 56.102(g), 56.103 
(2005); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(a), 46.102(g) (2005).  The IRB’s primary role is to safeguard the rights and 
welfare of human subjects.
256
 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2005).
36
disproportionately bear the burdens of the research.  On the other hand, if the 
experimental treatment holds promise of significant benefit for participants, then all but 
the members of the selected minority will be deprived of the opportunity to enjoy that 
benefit during clinical trials.  
Furthermore, if a study focusing on a particular minority will include a large 
number of economically or educationally disadvantaged individuals, investigators who 
are eager to recruit and retain subjects might be insensitive to their limitations and 
vulnerabilities. Extra care must be taken to ensure that potential subjects fully 
understand the trial and its implications and are not coerced into enrolling.257  These 
concerns will be acute if English is not the subjects’ first language (which may be the 
case for many Hispanics or Asians), if there is a placebo control arm in which subjects 
will be deprived of standard therapy,258 or if enrollees are offered generous financial 
incentives, which some may feel unable to decline.259
D. Discrimination Theory
The law’s anti-discrimination mandates do not categorically prohibit differential 
treatment.  Rather, with respect to certain conduct, the law requires that those who wish 
to treat individuals differently ask the right questions and do so with adequate 
justification. Likewise, attribute-based medicine, which can be discriminatory by nature 
if the attributes at issue are possessed primarily by members of a particular protected 
class, should not be conducted unless the patient group that will benefit from the 
treatment has been carefully and accurately identified.
To illustrate this principle I will focus on a few well- known anti-discrimination 
laws and on two provisions that govern biomedical research, as discussed above.260  The 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits discrimination by 
governmental actors261 but allows it when a compelling governmental interest justifies 
the conduct at issue, and the conduct is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
goal.262  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination 
based on race, color, national origin, sex, and religion,263 but allows discrimination 
where “religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
257 See Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials:  Responsible Research or Unethical 
Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 484-490 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of obtaining meaningful 
informed consent from research participants and the flaws of the typical informed consent process).
258 See id. at 452-460 (discussing placebo controls and concerns about their use).  For further discussion see 
infra Part VI.A (discussing safeguards that should be implemented for attribute-based research).
259 See National Bioethics Advisory Committee, Discussion and Recommendations on Undue Inducement, 
reprinted in Undue Influence and Coercion, http://alumni.imsa.edu/~jason/ethics_topics/undue.html
(stating that monetary payments can induce subjects to participate in research; Office of Research Support 
Committees, The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Guidelines for 
Payment/Reimbursement of Research Subjects, available at 
http://www.uth.tmc.edu/ut_general/research_acad_aff/orsc/cphs/guidelines/pay.htm (prohibiting “monetary 
inducements to be utilized to recruit subjects for studies involving significant risk or excessive pain or 
discomfort”).
260 See supra Part V.C.
261 See supra Part V.A.
262 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 900 (1995). 
263
  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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enterprise.”264  Thus, an employer might be able to discriminate in hiring actors of a 
particular gender or national origin for the sake of depicting authentic and believable 
characters, to hire only females to serve as attendants in women’s dressing rooms out of 
respect for the privacy of female customers, and to employ only male guards in high 
security male prisons because of safety concerns.265  The Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA)266 prohibits employment discrimination based on disability, but authorizes
employers to exclude a candidate or employee if she cannot be reasonably 
accommodated by the employer267 or will constitute a direct threat to the health or safety 
of himself or others in the workplace.268
In the research arena, the NIH Guidelines mandate inclusion of minorities in 
clinical studies unless concern about “the health of the subjects or the purpose of the 
research” militates against inclusive selection criteria.269  Similarly, the federal 
regulations require equitable selection of subjects but enable IRBs to “take into account 
the purposes of the research and the setting in which the research will be conducted” in 
evaluating whether subjects are recruited properly.270
While all of the above-described provisions generally constitute anti-
discrimination mandates, they allow for selectivity, exclusion, or actions that adversely 
affect a protected class under particular, defensible circumstances.  Likewise, this 
Article does not per se argue against attribute-based medicine.  It does, however, 
contend that this approach must not be practiced in an irresponsible or unjustifiably 
discriminatory fashion.  Basing research design or medical decisions solely on an 
individual’s “race” is not a sound methodology because “race” does not mean anything 
coherent.271  Medical researchers and health care providers must focus on more 
sophisticated and revealing classifications.  It is clear that there are differences in 
treatment responses among individuals, and certainly these individuals can be 
categorized into groups.  The proper classifications might involve genetic variation, 
geographic origin, socio-economic status, diet, exercise, or other factors,272 and if these 
are meaningful predictors of illness or appropriate treatment course, they should 
certainly be considered.  Medical decision-making that is exclusively “race-based,” 
however, is contrary to the ethical and legal norms that govern the practice of medicine.
264
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).  Note that “race” and color are not included in the list of allowable 
exceptions.  However, in rare circumstances the BFOQ defense has been applied to race and color 
discrimination as well.   JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 173-174 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing affirmative action programs, the hiring of actors for 
“race”-specific roles, and law enforcement positions that might require “racial” hiring).
265 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note __, at 171-72 (discussing BFOQ defenses based on authenticity, 
privacy, and safety needs).
266
 42 U.S.C. §§  12101-12213 (2000). 
267
 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
268
 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000); Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 73 (2002) (holding that the direct 
threat defense applies to cases in which job performance would threaten the applicant’s or employee’s own 
health even if he did not pose a direct threat to anyone else in the workplace).  
269 NIH GUIDELINES, supra note __.
270
 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2005).
271 See supra Part III.
272 See supra Part IV.A and infra Part VI.B.
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VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The advent of BiDil may well portend a future in which attribute-based medicine 
is enthusiastically pursued.273  This approach could hold great promise for improving 
human health, but it must be embraced cautiously.  The following section will delineate 
several safeguards that should be implemented in order to address the risks and dangers 
of attribute-based medicine.
A. Review of Research Studies by Scientific Review Boards and IRBs
Prior to allowing a clinical trial involving human subjects to proceed, the FDA 
requires the study’s sponsor to submit an investigational new drug (IND) application.274
The proposal then undergoes an extensive scientific review process in which it is 
scrutinized by groups with expertise in medicine, chemistry, and 
pharmacology/toxicology to ascertain its scientific integrity and safety.275 Thus,
attribute-based drugs or devices will be subjected to scientific review by the FDA.  In 
addition, some study sponsors conduct their own, internal scientific reviews of research 
protocols.276 Finally, most clinical trials must be approved by IRBs, institutional 
entities that are charged with responsibility for safeguarding the welfare of research 
participants.277 Both scientific review boards and IRBs should subject attribute -based
studies to particular scrutiny.
1. Scientific reviews
Scientific review boards should carefully review clinical trials that exclude 
particular populations in order to determine whether the trial design is justified by 
existing data.  The BiDil study, for example, has been criticized for including only 
African-Americans and failing to examine whether the combination of BiDil and 
standard therapy will benefit non African-Americans.278  Clinical trials should not be 
constructed to develop therapy for only one population group unless there is good
reason to believe that others will not benefit from it.  Moreover, as discussed below, if 
273 See Bowser, supra note 20, at 1124 (stating that “[o]ther BiDils are sure to surface” because 
“researchers are mining through decades of old clinical trials data to find an overlooked differential racial 
response to drugs”).
274
 Barbara Ann Binzak, How Pharmacogenomics will impact the Federal Regulation of Clinical Trials and 
the New Drug Approval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 117 (2003); 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(c) (2005).  In 
the IND application, the sponsor details the outcomes of animal studies, submits drug manufacturing data, 
and provides information concerning the study’s design.  21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2005).
275 CDER HANDBOOK, supra note __, at 15-16.
276 See Kennedy’s Disease Association, Scientific Review Board, available at 
www.kennedydisease.org/aboutus_board.html; Iron Disorders Institute, About IDI:  The Scientific Advisory 
Board, available at www.irondisorders.org/about/srb/ (stating that the advisors review “ongoing research of 
iron metabolism”); Cystinosis Research Network, Grant Proposal Guidelines, available at 
www.cystinosis.org/grantguidelines.html (discussing scientific review board review of research proposals 
submitted to the Cystinosis Research Network).
277
 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2005) (detailing “[c]riteria for IRB approval of 
research”).
278 See Kahn, supra note 54, at 481; Bloche, supra note __, at 2036.
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only one population will be included, the contours of the population should be 
thoughtfully and accurately delineated.
Scientific review boards should encourage researchers who will rely on self-
identification for purposes of inclusion criteria to take into account the limitations of this 
mechanism.279  In the 2000 census, almost seven million Americans indicated that they 
belonged to two or more “races.”280  In addition, many more individuals could consider 
themselves to be of mixed origin and have genetic admixtures.281  If a study that is 
designed to be population exclusive has numerous subjects with significant ancestral 
mixing, its results might be skewed and inaccurate.  Moreover, self-identified “race” 
alone will rarely if ever be a scientifically valid criterion for study enrollment since it 
lacks meaning in genetic and biological terms.  As a recent study concluded, “significant 
population substructure differences exist that self-reported race alone does not 
capture.”282 Researchers who believe that geographic origin might be informative for 
research purposes should not only require self-identification but also ask subjects 
specific questions about their ancestries in order to gather more accurate information.
Furthermore, scientific review boards should require investigators to formulate 
careful hypotheses regarding factors that will influence treatment response.  If 
applicable, they should control for psychosocial, economic, environmental, cultural, 
educational and other non-biological factors that might provide a partial or complete 
explanation for treatment response rate differences.283 These might include diet, 
exercise, stress, exposure to environmental toxins, or cultural and religious barriers that 
can affect protocol compliance.284
A book by Anne Fadiman entitled The Spirit Catches You and You Fall285
highlights some potential social and belief-based hurdles to optimal health care.   It 
follows an immigrant Hmong family, whose young daughter suffers from severe 
epilepsy, through years of encounters with the American medical and social service 
systems.  Despite everyone’s best intentions, the daughter’s medical treatment fails time 
279
 As noted  in Part III.A, Neil Risch and his colleagues analyzed DNA samples and found that the samples 
clustered into four major groups that corresponded to the subjects’ self-identified “race.”  The components 
they analyzed, however, were microsatellites, which are non-functional DNA that is highly illuminating 
with respect to group differences but not relevant to health status and other medical information. 
Furthermore, they did not focus on individuals of mixed “race” origins.   See supra notes 102-105 and 
accompanying text.
280 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 135-136 and accompanying text.
282
 Jill S. Barnholtz-Sloan et al., Examining Population Stratification via Individual Ancestry Estimates 
versus Self-Reported Race, 14 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1545 (2005).  The 
study found that the risk genotype at issue “varied substantially within self-reported racial group by 
individual ancestry and case-control status.”  Id. at 1550.
283 See Hacking, supra note __ at 102, 109 (stating that BiDil might be particularly effective for African-
Americans because of social factors, such as diet); Shields et al., supra note __, at 96 (recommending 
measurement of “specific social dimensions known to have an impact on health and health outcomes”); 
Winker, supra note __, at 1614 (encouraging investigators to measure a number of different variables, 
including “socioeconomic status, education, urban vs. rural location, or income region by ZIP code” in 
order to determine the true reasons for the outcome at issue).
284 See infra note 283.  See also supra Part IV.A for discussion of purported “race-based” outcome 
differentials and the non-racial factors to which they might in truth be attributed.
285 ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL DOWN 1997).
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and again.  The family has difficulty obtaining adequate translations during doctors’ 
visits; the doctors, who are eager to improve the youngster’s condition, frequently alter 
medication dosages so that the parents are unable to follow the ever-changing 
instructions; and some of the parents’ religious beliefs impede both their comprehension 
of medical circumstances and their acceptance of particular recommended treatments.286
This experience surely is not unique.  Thus, while particular communities that are 
involved in clinical trials may demonstrate unusual therapeutic responses, these 
phenomena might have nothing to do with biological or genetic characteristics.287
Although controlling for many variables will likely be more difficult and costly than 
differentiating subjects based only on  “race,” it is the only way to achieve accurate
study outcomes.
2. Institutional Review Boards
IRBs do not review the scientific validity of clinical trial proposals, but rather, 
are entrusted with safeguarding the welfare of human subjects.288   IRBs should be 
particularly vigilant when reviewing attribute-based protocols that are targeted at 
particular population groups.  The federal regulations mandate that the selection of 
participants be equitable.289  IRBs, like scientific review boards, should scrutinize 
population-specific protocols to ensure that the selection criteria are justified by 
scientific data.   IRBs must not approve protocols in which one or more minority group 
will bear the burden of undergoing experimental treatments unless there is sufficient 
reason to believe that the particular minority or minorities will benefit from the therapy
and that other groups are significantly less likely to respond positively to it.290 Thus, 
clinical studies should not be limited to minorities without data supporting this decision, 
and the mere hope that an experimental medication will turn out to be an attribute-based 
drug that will generate high profits for the drug manufacturer should not justify 
discriminatory inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The problem is exacerbated if many of the minority subjects are likely to be 
economically disadvantaged.  If that is the case, the informed consent process should be 
tailored to be comprehended by subjects with limited educations.291 The informed 
286 Id. pp. 83-84, 110-113,176-180, 186-190, 219-224.
287 See Shankar Vedantam, Racial Disparities Found in Pinpointing Mental Illness, WASH. POST, June 28, 
2005, at __ (reporting that Blacks in the U.S. were more than four times as likely to be diagnosed with 
schizophrenia as Whites, quoting an expert as stating that  “there is a risk a psychiatrist with a different 
cultural experience than a patient can misinterpret the expression of a psychiatric symptom,” and describing 
“’focus units’ – inpatient psychiatric centers that focus on how culture and ethnicity influence psychiatric 
diagnosis and treatment”).
288
 21 C.F.R. §56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2005) (detailing “[c]riteria for IRB approval of 
research”).
289
  21 C.F.R. §56.111(3) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(3) (2005).
290 See  21 C.F.R. §56.111(2) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(2) (2005) (providing that “[r]isks to subjects are 
reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that 
may reasonably be expected to result”).
291 See  21 C.F.R. §50.25 (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (detailing requirements for informed consent 
and stating that the information conveyed “shall be in language understandable to the subject or the 
representative”).  See also Hoffman, supra note 257, at 484-490  (discussing the difficulties of obtaining 
meaningful informed consent from human subjects); S. Grossman et al., Are Informed Consent Forms That 
Describe Clinical Oncology Research Protocols Readable By Most Patients and Their Families?  12 J. 
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consent process should include extensive verbal explanations, and the informed consent 
document should be kept as short as possible, with language that is targeted at an 
adequately low reading comprehension level.  Furthermore, any financial incentives that 
are provided for enrollment must not be so generous that they are too tempting for 
potential subjects and thereby essentially coerce enrollment.292
Finally, the informed consent process should clearly disclose to subjects that the 
clinical study is limited to particular population groups.  Some individuals may be 
concerned about potential stigmatization, discrimination, or other adverse consequences 
of ancestry-based medical research and practice293 and thus, will consider this 
information essential to their decision-making process.
B. Investigators and Health Care Providers
The above discussion of recommendations for scientific review boards and IRBs 
has already suggested guidelines for investigators who are designing attribute-specific 
clinical trials.294 Researchers should not design studies to include only one population 
unless there is sufficient reason to believe that only that group will benefit from the 
therapy and that other groups are significantly less likely to respond well to it.  Thus, the 
reasons for such a design must be medical rather than related to a desire for profit or 
recruitment shortcuts.  
If research is to focus on a particular “race,” investigators must be aware of the 
limitations of self-identification and its inaccuracies.  Furthermore, researchers should 
design studies that carefully control for psychosocial, economic, environmental, 
cultural, educational, and other non-biological factors.  They must also do everything 
possible to obtain meaningful informed consent from subjects who might have limited 
educations, reading comprehension levels, and ability to process medical data.  The 
informed consent process should include disclosure of the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria for the research project.  Finally, investigators must offer only modest financial 
recruitment incentives, if any, so that payments do not become overly enticing and 
coercive for economically disadvantaged subjects.
A few words of caution should be added for medical personnel who do not 
design studies but employ attribute -based therapies in their practices.  In order to avoid 
potential medical malpractice claims and violation of anti-discrimination mandates, 
health care providers should eschew making treatment  decisions solely based on their 
judgment of a patient’s “racial” identity.  Precise identification of ancestral origin is 
difficult if not impossible to make based on visual observation alone, and efforts to do 
so are prone to error.  To illustrate, one study analyzed the “racial” designations of 
infants who died in their first year of life.  The study showed that 4.3 percent of babies 
categorized as Black at birth were deemed to be other than Black on their death 
CLIN. ONCOL. 2211, 2212 (1994) (finding that the typical consent form that describes a clinical oncology 
protocol is “too complex to be read by most patients and their families” because the average person reads at 
approximately an eighth grade reading level, and the mean grade level required for comprehension of the 
forms that were studied was between 11.1 and 14.1, depending on the index used).    
292 See supra note 259.
293 See supra Part IV for discussion of the risks and dangers of “racial profiling” in medicine.
294 See supra Part VI.A.
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certificates, and thirty-seven percent of those categorized as Native American on their 
birth certificates were classified differently on their death certificates.295  The confusion 
is often due to the mixed ancestral origins of so many Americans.296  Another study that 
asked respondents to identify “ambiguous-race faces” found only a sixty-eight percent 
correct identification rate.297
Certainly, physicians should discuss genetic testing for the Tay Sachs allele with 
Jewish people who are contemplating having a child and genetic testing for the sickle
cell allele with African-Americans who are considering pregnancy because of the 
prevalence of the diseases in these populations.  However, physicians should not rely on 
the fact that an individual looks Black or Asian in deciding whether to discuss the topic.  
Instead, they should ask their patients specific questions about their ancestry.298
Moreover, while one’s ancestry might be relevant to medical care in limited 
circumstances, physicians would be misguided to rely on this factor exclusively for most 
treatment decisions.  Health status and therapeutic responses depend on socio-economic 
factors, specific alleles that are shared among all populations, or other elements, not on 
the color of one’s skin.299
Health care givers who will use attribute-based medicine must carefully review 
current literature and emerging research results so that they understand its subtleties.  
Within their areas of expertise, health care providers must be familiar with the factors 
that influence health status and treatment response and be able to accurately identify the 
attributes at issue in order to best serve their patients.
C. Public Discourse Concerning Attribute-Based Medicine:
The Responsibilities of Investigators, Institutions, and the Media
Scientists, research institutions, and the media must act cautiously and 
responsibly in generating public discourse about attribute-based medicine.  Medical 
professionals and journalists should not convey information that is exaggerated or
inflated.  They must not fuel the fires of prejudice and ignorance by reinforcing
stereotypes and misconceptions about biological differences among “races.”
Researchers might be tempted to rush to the media with preliminary,
ambiguous, or questionable research results in order to obtain headlines that will 
295
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promote their careers, enhance opportunities for further funding of their projects,300 or 
please sponsors who are supporting their studies.301 Investigators have been criticized 
for seeking publicity for “hot” research news prematurely302  either for personal gain or 
in order to promote “favourable science policy and the financial support required to
sustain costly research facilities.”303  Even if individual researchers are restrained, their 
institutions might seek inappropriate media coverage and engage in hyperbole for the 
sake of financial and reputational advantage.304
In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Guidelines for 
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information 
Disseminated by Federal Agencies,305 which require federal agencies to develop 
mechanisms to safeguard the “objectivity, utility, and integrity” of the information they 
release.306  Thus, if governmental entities are involved in the research and are the ones 
to engage in media contact, there is greater likelihood that accuracy will be achieved.  
Academic institutions should consider developing similar guidelines to enhance the 
integrity of the data conveyed to the public.307
At the same time, the media has been criticized for distortions in its reporting of 
scientific information.308  Reporters may not fully understand the data, may oversimplify 
research results in order to make them accessible to readers, or may embellish facts in 
order to foster readers’ interest.309  The media has also been criticized for reporting 
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scientific data before it has been published in peer reviewed journals and thus, prior to 
its validation by experts in the field.310 Journalists may report results that they know to 
be preliminary, unclear, or dubious as definitive and groundbreaking.311  For example, a 
trial that shows that fifty-four percent of Whites responded well to a particular 
medication and forty-seven percent of Blacks reacted similarly to it may be reported as 
establishing that there are unmistakable and dramatic differences between Whites and 
Blacks with respect to the illness at issue and its course of treatment.  In order to remain 
competitive in the market, journalists may sacrifice a degree of integrity for the sake of  
creating dramatic headlines by depicting research results as more promising than they 
are or skewing data to exaggerate health risks.312
In the alternative, the media may tailor its reporting to its targeted audience.  A 
recent study revealed that information about breast cancer was reported differently in 
Canadian newspapers known to be read by Jews and those read by other 
communities.313 The study found that forty-seven percent of the articles examined in 
Jewish newspapers identified genetics as a major risk factor, while only seventeen 
percent of stories in newspapers with more general readerships did the same.314 The 
authors also found many shortcomings in the way information was conveyed in both 
types of newspapers, including inconsistencies, data gaps, and confusing descriptions.315
If the press modifies its stories to appeal to its targeted audience’s presumed concerns 
and interests and distorts information, it can cause significant harm by inducing readers 
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or viewers to underestimate health risks or undervalue certain medical choices, such as 
genetic testing.
Some professional organizations such as the Society of Professional Journalists 
and the American Medical Writers Association have developed their own codes of 
ethics for journalists writing about science and medicine.316  These include the 
principles that journalists “should apply objectivity, scientific accuracy and rigor, and
fair balance,”317 that journalists “[t]est the accuracy of information from all sources,”318
and that they “[a]void stereotyping by race” or other classifications.319 Although these 
ethical codes are not legally binding, every journalist would be wise to follow them.
Scientists, research institutions, and the media all bear responsibility for 
educating the public concerning scientific data.320  If information is distorted to indicate 
that there are significant biological differences among “races” and that some “races” are 
more diseased than others or less easily treatable, negative and dangerous stereotypes 
and prejudices could be reinforced.321  Furthermore, some may feel justified in 
discriminating against particular population groups in the workplace or elsewhere based 
on allegedly hard data.322 Finally, readers and viewers may make errors in seeking 
medical care and making medical choices based on what they believe they have learned 
about risks and treatments for their “race.”  Consequently, all parties must be restrained 
and fastidious about accuracy when discussing scientific information, especially that 
which relates to attribute-based research and treatments.323
One additional area of concern is direct -to-consumer (DTC) advertising, which 
is likely to include advertising concerning “racially-tailored” medications, as they 
become available on the market.324 A robust body of literature is emerging concerning 
DTC advertising, 325 and an extensive analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope 
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of this Article.  DTC advertising, however, is another arena that will need to be carefully 
watched and addressed if “race-based” therapies become a force in the marketplace.
VII
CONCLUSION
The medical community is demonstrating a growing interest in “racially-
tailored” medical practice and research.  “Racially-tailored,” however, is the wrong 
concept.  To the extent that a group approach is appropriate, health care professionals 
should be thinking in terms of attribute-based medicine and taking great care to identify 
the relevant attributes correctly. “Race” is a concept with no coherent meaning, and 
disease vulnerabilities, the course of illness, and treatment responses do not depend on 
the shade of one’s skin color or the texture of one’s hair.  Instead, medical professionals 
should focus on far more specific questions about ancestry and geographic origin, on 
socioeconomic and environmental conditions, on health habits, on factors affecting 
treatment compliance, and on specific alleles linked to the condition in question.
Concentrating on the issue of “race” in the therapeutic and research contexts can 
lead to medical mistakes, reinforcement of stereotypes, exacerbation of health 
disparities, and violation of various anti-discrimination provisions. In the words of one 
commentator, “[t]o use the rhetoric of science to sell the idea that historical inequity 
should be embraced as biological inevitability is an insult to those who value a common 
humanity.”326
In order to guard against the dangers of attribute-based medicine, the FDA and 
research institutions should subject clinical studies that target only particular population
groups to extensive scrutiny by scientific review boards and IRBs.  Health care 
professionals should avoid making treatment decisions based solely on their visual 
judgment of a patient’s ancestral origins and should review literature that analyzes all 
factors contributing to different disease vulnerabilities and treatment response rates 
among patients.  Furthermore, researchers, research institutions, and the media, must be 
constrained and responsible in communicating scientific data to the public so as not to 
reinforce stereotypes and prejudice or induce patients to make misguided decisions 
about their own care.
Finally, on a national policy level, policy officials should think carefully about 
the resources allocated to the development of attribute-based medicine.  As discussed 
above, many experts attribute health disparities such as differences in hypertension rates 
to non-biological factors, including diet, environment, exercise, and stress.327  While 
developing attribute-based drugs might improve treatment for certain patients, it will not 
constitute a panacea that will eliminate all health disparities.  Consequently, in light of 
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limited resources, prudent decisions need to be made concerning funding allocation 
between medical research endeavors and other initiatives in the areas of education, 
nutrition, environment, and job training that could do more to improve the health status 
of disadvantaged minorities.328  Despite the appeal of attribute-based medicine, 
resources should not be diverted away from projects intended to diminish 
socioeconomic injustice, which are at least as important for those adversely affected by 
health disparities.
It is only with careful thought and appropriate precautions that attribute-based
medicine can become an approach that enhances treatment opportunities for all human 
beings and contributes significantly to public health and welfare.
328 See Kahn, supra note 54, at 479.
